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1. Introduction  
In this present age of globalisation, interconnectedness and collaboration have never been 
more emphasised. With time there is a larger recognition of the world as a singular stage and 
more actors are acting in such a manner, thus when large powers collaborate it is also of 
importance to the global forum. The two countries central to this project are Russia and 
China. They share a fascinating undulating history and dynamics, which consequently have an 
effect on the world stage. The Chinese initiated Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), 
which is an interesting indicator of the relations between Russia and China growing closer 
that has accelerated in the recent years. 
 
But, this was not always so as both the countries seemed weary about how they fit in each 
other‟s foreign policies. Soviet Union and China went through a strained relationship, and 
after the collapse of USSR, Russia went back and forth between its western and eastern 
identity. But, they both do share a similar goal of gaining world prominence. Russia wants to 
reclaim its waning influence of the Soviet era and China wants to promote itself in the global 
arena. 
     
This intention has been clearly expressed by both parties in 1997 in a Sino-Russian joint 
statement regarding Worldwide Multi-Polarization and Establishment of New International 
Order.  This was followed by the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 
2001 and the signing of Treaty of Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation the same 
year, which was a major landmark in their joint history by resolving some of contentious 
issues. 
 
A growing relationship between the two countries is a significant development for the region 
and the world, especially when taken into context the intentions of both the countries.    
1.1 Problem Area  
China and Russia collaborate in many arenas of the international society, out of which SCO, 
UN and BRIC are the prominent ones. Both of the countries have shared similar opinions in 
the United Nations‟ Security Council, while they are active members of BRIC and are the 
leading members of the SCO. They have collaborated in such global platforms but very 
seldom are as engaged in smaller regional group such as the SCO. Apart from the SCO being 
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initiated by the Chinese they are currently also financing the secretariat. This marks a 
significant development in China‟s foreign policy, as traditionally it does not involve itself in 
closed multilateral commitments. The SCO functions as a collaborative platform for both 
Russia and China to deal with some of their shared issues in the region as well as project their 
cooperation trajectory. Historically, significant bilateral activity has succeeded developments 
with the SCO or the former body called Shanghai Five, as in the case of Treaty of 
Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation or the Sino-Russian joint statement regarding 
Worldwide Multi-Polarization and Establishment of New International Order. Unlike 
previously, the two countries have reached a mutual understanding of each other and are 
experiencing a steady growth in relations making it a recent trend. 
 
Such a trend also brings about varied perceptions of Sino-Russian collaboration. When 
considering the collaboration from a neorealist view, Stephen M. Walt would determine the 
SCO as a manifestation of Russia and China‟s intention to align against a unipolar world or 
the US hegemony. Other scholars would consider the SCO to be only a regional actor, 
initiated to solve issues of a particular geographical area. Despite whichever reality, existence 
of an active and powerful Central-Asian body might consequently affect the power 
equilibrium of the present, causing it to shift towards the East, dilute the current power 
stronghold of certain regions or just remain constant. The relationship between Russia and 
China presents multiple perspectives and discussions, from the basis of the following problem 
formulation we will seek to clarify some of them.  
 
1.2 Problem Formulation  
How can one characterise China and Russia‟s relationship, departing from their 
engagement within the SCO? Furthermore what does it entail for the power equilibrium 
of the world? 
1.3 Research Questions 
 Which motives can we identify from Russia and China‟s engagement in the SCO? 
 Does Russia and China‟s relationship go beyond a strategic partnership? If so, what 
additional characteristics does it entail? 
 How is Russia and China‟s relationship perceived by external actors? And what are 
the effects on their behaviour? 
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2. Methodology  
2.1 Introduction  
In the following chapter we will go through our methodological reflection, research strategy 
and choice of philosophy of science. It features our project design which illustrates the 
structure of the project. Furthermore it will outline some of the sources of errors that have 
presented themselves throughout our research, the limitations and conceptual clarifications we 
have found necessary to make.  
2.2 Motivation 
Our fundamental approach to this project is motivated by an interest in alliances; how they are 
formed and what impact an alliance might have on the structures of the international system. 
The idea behind the project arose from discussions on how new trends within global politics 
and international relations challenges world order and the global power equilibrium. We are 
mainly interested in how alliances between certain actors can generate new dynamics and new 
challenges, which might affect the power equilibrium of the world. 
Looking at the world today, the U.S still remains the only super power. This leaves us with a 
clear perception of an unequal power distribution toward the West. Though, we cannot 
overlook the rapid growth of China and its significant influence on the global stage. We 
perceive China as an extremely important actor in a globalised world and take great interest in 
their behaviour and intentions as a rising great power. Bringing in the notion, of a relationship 
between China and Russia that seems to be growing stronger, presents us with a foundation 
for our research – What sort of relationship does the two actors have and what does an 
alignment between Russia and China imply from the perspective of the international system. 
Our interest in China and Russia is to a great extend linked to their characters as actors on the 
global stage, both due to their similarities but even more due to their differences. China is 
perceived as a rising power, where Russia belongs to the list of old established powers – it is 
mainly this difference we see as a central aspect in defining the relationship between the two 
actors.   
We share an understanding of the forces and motives that cause states to align are of great 
importance to the processes and movements in the international system and shifts in the 
distribution of global power. Therefore we regard this project as a valuable contribution to 
discussion on the changing global order.  
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2.3 Project Design  
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2.4 Choice of Method & Philosophy of Science 
We have chosen the qualitative method as our main approach for this project as we believe 
the importance of understanding the variables in the natural setting than by relying solely on 
the quantifiable ones. This choice of method is also impacted by the range of our empirical 
source, which is not solely statistical or numeric. We believe that this approach will provide 
appropriate means for our analysis, since we will investigate and understand the different 
processes of an alliance and how that alliance can affect world order. Furthermore, the 
characteristics of the qualitative research method are similar to how we will investigate this 
project. It perceives and discovers meanings, and thus the analysis will provide some answers 
to the problem formulation based on the collected data concerning processes and other 
contexts (Olsen 2005: 210). 
This project will mainly use the Documentary Method. We have gathered a variety of 
different documents and sources to support the validity of the analysis and to supplement the 
theory with real-life impressions (Ibid: 204).  
We have throughout the project worked within the framework of Critical Rationalism (CR). 
With this project we wish to achieve growth of knowledge within the subjects of alliance 
formations and the changing world. The ontology of CR is based on the objective to achieve 
progress in realising the empirical world‟s real nature (Koch in Fuglsang &Olsen 2004: 81). 
The ontology of our project is quite similar hence the fact that we strive to emphasise the 
progress of the growing relationship between China and Russia and seeks to understand what 
it entails and how it affects world order.  
The philosopher Karl Raimund Popper presented the following model explaining the process 
of realisation; P1 (first problem realisation) TT(tentative theory)  EE(Error elimination
1
) 
 P2 (modified problem) (Ibid: 86). This model is consistent with our approach to the 
project. We started with a realisation of a problem – How can alliances affect world order? 
We have sought to answer our problem formulation assisted with alliance theory by Stephen 
M. Walt. Afterwards, we tried to eliminate errors in the understanding of the problem area 
and the selected theory. While answering our problem formulation new areas of interest were 
revealed and therefore given rise to new problem realisations. The methodological philosophy 
of CR begins and ends with a problem.  
                                                          
1
 Translated from Koch in Fuglsang and Olsen (2004)  
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The epistemology of CR is the notion that causalities can help us to understand reality. 
According to CR, there is no definitive truth in any statement on the reality, but a statement‟s 
convergence with reality can be assed to some extent (Ibid: 82). To achieve realisation of the 
reality Popper presents The Hypothetic-Deductive Method (HDM). The model consists of 
three main elements; the event, the universal law and the initial conditions report. The event is 
what one wishes to explain; in our case, the engagement of the SCO, universal laws are 
statements that refer to characteristics of elements. In CR the universal laws are understood as 
expressed theories about the world and viewed as fallible hypothesis, they are fallible because 
one cannot be sure of that the statements about the reality are true (Ibid: 88p). One can view 
Walt‟s alliance theory as a universal law. We use his hypotheses to obtain truths concerning 
alliance behaviour between sovereign states, knowing that our results are not definitive truths. 
The initial conditions report consist of singular statements that combined describe the 
conditions of the current system from which one tries to explain the given event. In our 
project this present in our efforts understand if Russia and China‟s relationship would have an 
effect on world order. 
2.5 Sources of Errors  
Within the process of writing our project we have encountered some issues/errors we will 
have to account for. We have had problems with accessing the official website for the SCO, 
www.sectsco.org, and our possibilities of using it have therefore been somewhat inconsistent.  
Since the main actors of our analysis are Russia and China, many of the primary sources are 
in Russian and Chinese; we have tried to compensate this by using a vast variety of journals 
analysing the SCO, written by various nationalities and different institutes. We are aware of 
the pitfalls that this can contain as we are not able to check the validity of those journals use 
of primary sources. Also not analysing primary sources, but secondary once, limits us in 
relying on others work to draw our own conclusions we have as mentioned compensated this 
by using a vast variety of sources.   
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2.6 Conceptual Clarifications  
Throughout this project we use the terms alliance and strategic partnership, due to the term‟s 
significance for our analysis of the relationship between Russia and China, we see it necessary 
to clarify these conceptions. Furthermore in our analysis we discuss the notions of Hard and 
Soft balancing, which we also will clarify below.  
Alliance: According to Stephen M. Walt: “An alliance is a formal or informal arrangement 
for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.” (Walt 1987: 12). For our 
purpose we use this definition to establish if an alliance could be observed between Russia 
and China. We are aware of the SCO‟s official denial of their cooperation being an alliance, 
but as Walt states there are many different kinds of alliances for example formal or informal 
alliance.  
Strategic Partnership: This term will be introduced in the analysis, because the SCO stresses 
that its cooperation is a strategic partnership and not an alliance. There are many ways of 
interpreting strategic partnership within IR theories, and we have chosen to use and 
understand the term as a coordinated cooperation.  
Hard Balancing: Hard balancing does, according to Walt, encounter the overall balance of 
power in the sense of being able to challenge the dominant power by assembling a strong 
countervailing coalition (Walt 2009: 104).  
Soft Balancing: On the contrary does soft balancing, according to Walt, acknowledge the 
power balance, however it tries to achieve better results by assembling an opposing coalition, 
whose main goal is to thwart (or impede) specific policies (Ibid.).  
 
2.7 Delimitations  
In our project as we focus on the growing relations between China and Russia, we will focus 
on those two actors, taking departure in their engagement in the SCO. The remaining four 
Central Asian countries will only be considered when their presence influences the motives of 
Russia and China. Even though the observer states within the SCO are a source of great 
speculation, we will not elaborate on their status or SCO‟s motives behind engaging non-
regional actors.  
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In Walt‟s The Origins of Alliances he describes different ways of alliance formation; in this 
project we only use the hypothesis on balancing and bandwagoning, while leaving out his 
hypotheses on causalities between ideology and alliance formations as well as the causalities 
between foreign aid and alliance formations. We do because we do not see the latter 
compatible with the investigated relationship between Russia and China.  
 
 
 
3. Theory 
3.1 Stephen M. Walt:  The Origins of Alliances 
Professor Stephen M. Walt is a contributor to the neorealist stand on international relations 
theory. In his book The Origins of Alliances (1987) Walt explores the causes and patterns for 
how states align. He builds his theory around a case study of alignments in the Middle East in 
the period 1955-1979 and conducts his research on several hypotheses. The core of Walt‟s 
theory is a reformulation of neorealist Kenneth Waltz Power Balance theory. From Walt‟s 
perspective other factors than power plays in to the equation when state chooses to align, 
therefore his theory is based on the notion of balance of threats.  
“In anarchy, states form alliances to protect themselves. Their conduct is 
determined by the threats they perceive, and the power of others is merely one 
element in their calculations. The power of other states can be either a liability 
or an asset, depending on where it is located, what it can do, and how it is used. 
By incorporating the other factors that creates threats to national sovereignty, 
balance of threat theory provides a better explanation of alliances formation 
than does balance of power theory.” (Walt 1987: X).  
According to Walt investigating the motives for alliance formations is important, because of 
the forces that bring states together and drive them apart, will affect the security of individual 
states by determining both how large a threat they face and how much help they can expect. 
In addition, the factors that determine how states choose alliance partners will shape the 
evolution of the international system as a whole (Ibid: 1).  
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Alliance Behaviour  
Walt‟s theory of “Balancing Threats” views alliances as a response to threats. He defines two 
types of alliance behaviour that states will turn to when confronted with external threats; 1) 
Balancing or 2) Bandwagoning. Balancing refers to allying with others against the prevailing 
threat; Bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger (Ibid: 17). 
Balancing Hypothesis  
According to the balance of threat theory, states join alliances to protect themselves from 
states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat to them. In its most typical 
form, states seek to counter threats by adding the power of another state to their own. 
Superpowers will seek alliances to counter threats from other superpowers or to prevent these 
from expanding. Balancing behaviour occurs for two main reasons. First, states choose to 
balance with other states because they place their survival at risk, if they fail to confine a 
hegemon before it becomes too strong. When balancing, states choose to align with those 
states that cannot easily dominate their allies, in order to prevent being dominated by those 
who can. Secondly, when allying with the weaker side the state increases its influence within 
the alliance as the new member, because the weaker side is in greater need for assistance. In 
contrast if a state chooses to align with the stronger side, its influence will be low because it 
adds less to the coalition, and leaves itself vulnerable to its allies in the dominant coalition. 
Walt considers balancing as the preferred choice of alliance behaviour (Ibid: 20). 
Balancing Behaviour by Superpowers  
On the basis of his study in the Middle East, Walt argues it can be expected from superpowers 
to seek allies to counter the significant threat of another superpower. A Superpower would be 
most energetic in balancing whenever its position vis-à-vis the other superpower deteriorates. 
Cooperation between superpowers will therefore be extremely rare because they are each 
other‟s greatest potential threat (Ibid: 153). 
Balancing Behaviour by Regional Powers  
When focusing on the balancing behaviour by regional powers, Walt argues that because 
regional states are more sensitive to threats from regional actors, alliances are formed to 
balance the threats from other local actors instead of superpowers. Walt claims that regional 
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states have little concern for the global power balance. Because when it comes to alliances 
choices they are mainly concerned with responding to a threat from another regional power 
(Ibid: 158).  
Bandwagoning Hypothesis 
Even though Walt identifies balancing as the optimal and most common alliance behaviour, 
he observes that the opposite notion of bandwagoning is far more widespread. The 
bandwagoning hypothesis is based on the notion that power attracts states. In contrast if a 
state declines in power position, it is likely that its numbers of allies would decrease. The 
more powerful the state and the more clearly it demonstrates this power, the more likely 
others are to ally with it. Weaker states are more likely to bandwagon than strong ones, 
because they are vulnerable to pressure and they can do little to determine their faiths. Walt 
identifies two distinct motives for bandwagoning; First, bandwagoning may be a form of 
appeasement. By aligning with the dominant state or coalition, the bandwagoner may hope to 
avoid an attack by diverting it elsewhere. Second, a state may align with the dominant side in 
wartimes in order to share the spoils of victory (Ibid: 21). The first motive of bandwagoning 
is a defensive reasoning of preserving ones independence, the second motive is offensive 
reasoning where states bandwagon to share the fruits of victory. States are more likely to 
bandwagon when useful allies are unavailable. Alliances based on bandwagoning are 
characterised as fragile alliances, with low levels of commitment. According to Walt‟s 
research bandwagoning is not to prefer and from his perspective plays a minor role in 
international politics.  
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When does States Balance? When does States Bandwagon?  
(Walt 1987: 29ppp).   
The two hypothesis of balancing or bandwagoning paints contrasting pictures of international 
politics and depicts different sorts of worlds as well as it implies different policy 
prescriptions.  
When balancing is the dominant tendency we will see a world where states that tries to 
dominate other states will attract a widespread opposition. Therefore aggression is 
discouraged; instead policies of restraint and benevolence are preferable. Strong states must 
appear nonaggressive if they wish to attract allies. Furthermore, their foreign and defence 
policies should aim at minimising the threat the state poses to others. A bandwagoning world 
is much more competitive and entails more intense international rivalries. Strong states are 
rewarded if they appear both strong and potentially aggressive. States will be more inclined to 
use force and can attract allies through their aggressive behaviour.  
Walt stresses that it is of extreme importance to be aware of the dominant tendency, because 
the policies that are appropriate for one situation, either balancing or bandwagoning, will 
backfire in the other (Ibid: 27).  
In general we can expect that balancing is the expected and more common behaviour, but it 
still leaves room for the possibility of bandwagoning. Whether states choose to balance or 
When do states… Balance  Bandwagon  
Strong vs. Small 
States 
- When they can affect  
outcome by their 
decisions  
- When threatened by 
states with roughly equal 
capabilities 
- Weaker states in a position 
where they can not affect the 
outcome  
- When threatened by a great 
power 
Availability of Allies  - When allies are available  - When allies are unavailable  
Peace/War  - Peace time or early stages 
of war  
- When on the losing side or 
neutral in war times states will 
bandwagon with the winning 
side 
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bandwagon also depends on the levels of threats a state faces. The table below sums up Walt‟s 
hypothesis on how the different sources of threats, and the character of a state, decides 
whether a state will balance or bandwagon.   
Hypotheses and Sources 
of Threats 
Balancing  Bandwagoning  
Core Assumption States facing an external threat will 
align with others to oppose the states 
posing the threat  
States facing an external threat will ally 
with the most threatening power 
Aggregate Power   
The accumulated power 
one state holds. 
Population, technology, 
industrial- and military 
capabilities.  
The greater the threatening state‟s 
aggregate power, the greater the 
tendency for others to align against it. 
The greater a state‟s aggregate 
capabilities, the greater the tendency for 
others to align with it. 
Geographic Proximity 
The threat of a state is 
greater, if it is nearby.   
The nearer a powerful state, the greater 
the tendency for those nearby to align 
against it. 
The nearer a powerful state, the greater 
the tendency for those nearby to align 
with it. 
Offensive Power 
Mobile military 
capabilities combined with 
geographic proximity 
The greater a state‟s offensive 
capabilities, the greater tendency for 
others to align against it. 
The greater a state‟s offensive 
capabilities, the greater tendency for 
others to align with it. 
Aggressive Intentions  
The greater the aggressive 
intentions are perceived, 
the greater the threat. 
The more aggressive a state‟s 
perceived intentions, the more likely 
others are to align against that state. 
The more aggressive a state‟s perceived 
intentions, the less likely others are to 
align against it. 
Alliance Character  Alliances formed during wartime will 
disintegrate when the enemy is 
defeated.  
Alliances formed to oppose a threat will 
disintegrate when the threat becomes 
serious. 
(Walt 1987: 22-33)  
Walt on World Order and the Balance of Power  
When Walt wrote The Origins of Alliances in 1987, the propositions of the book could tell a 
great deal about the balance of world power. The Cold War kept the world in a bipolar order, 
with the US and the Soviet Union as rival superpowers. In his book Walt makes a forecast 
that suggests that the Soviet Union in the future will experience more struggles than the US 
due to its geographical position and intentions. He believes that the Soviet Union will 
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experience the worst-case scenario, where China will choose not to align with the Soviet 
Union in spite of its position as the regional superpower, but instead tacitly align with the 
West, while India will remain neutral (Ibid: 274).  Looking at the world today, we must 
conclude that Walt‟s prediction was not fulfilled. He was right about the troublesome destiny 
of the Soviet Union, which resulted in its dissolution after the Cold War ended, but he was not 
fully able to predict how China would conduct itself as a rising power. In today‟s world, the 
power balance has shifted since the bipolar era and a new global order has emerged, where 
new actors are stepping on to the global scene to challenge the global power equilibrium. 
China has not chosen to formally align itself with the US or the West as Walt presumed, but 
neither has it declared its rise as a threat towards the west as would be expected from a 
neorealist perspective. The rise of China has been characterized as a “peaceful rise”, from the 
argument that China had no choice giving the current international situation (Guo 2006: 1p). 
The ambiguity of China‟s conduct as a rising power makes it an interesting actor, especially 
when it comes to its choices of alliance partners. Thus China will play an important role in the 
projects examination of the current alliance patterns in the region of Eurasia, through the 
establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. 
 
3.2 A Recap of World Order 
Before analysing how the relationship between China and Russia can affect the changing 
world order one must understand the concept of world order. Since our theoretical framework 
is based on Walt‟s neorealist view upon international relations, we will expand on his 
framework by presenting the neorealist‟ take on world order. In this section we will present a 
short recap of how leading neorealist perceives the development of world order. This will 
enable us to understand which perspective on world order we will need to apply to our 
analysis of the relationship between China and Russia to keep in line with our theoretical 
framework. In this section we will predominantly draw on Kenneth Waltz theoretical 
perceptions. 
A general notion on world order and international system is that in modern times it has moved 
through three different stages, first from a bipolar system that characterized the Cold War era, 
to the a unipolar system following the end of the Cold War and today we are discussing a 
system of multipolarity.  
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Kenneth Waltz perception of world order and international relations is based on elements 
from classical and neoclassical elements. His notion of the international system is that it 
consists of independent states that operate in a system of international anarchy. States are 
alike in all basic functional respects but differ in relative power. It is the power differential 
between states that can explain international relations – arguments for this can be found in 
Waltz theory of Balance of Power, which Walt does not find sufficient.  
Waltz depicts a world where the international system is characterised as anarchic and states 
operate on the basis of a strong concern for their own security and survival. States are seen as 
structures that respond to the impersonal constraints and dictates of the international system, 
thus it is the structures of the international system that dictates a state‟s behaviour. Therefore 
Waltz and the neorealist camp advocates for the bipolar system, which he perceives to be 
more stable and peaceful. With only two great powers one can expect them to act to maintain 
the system. The two powers will be each other‟s biggest enemies and they will strive to keep 
each other in check (Jackson & Sørensen 2010: 73pp).  
At the end of the Cold War the U.S. became the only superpower (regional hegemon), which 
changed bipolarity to unipolarity. The unipolarity is the least stable of all structures, according 
to the neorealist, because high concentration of power threatens other states and causes them 
to take action (Wohlforth 1999: 5). Therefore unipolarity will be prone to conflict between the 
unipole and other rising powers. A system of unipolarity therefore demands that the unipole 
must employ strategies of benevolence instead of coercion to maintain its pre-eminence. 
Some IR scholars claim that unipolarity is just an illusion or a temporary stage that paves the 
way for multipolarity, because unipolarity is too unstable to last (Ibid: 6). Wohlforth himself 
does not agree with the neorealist camp on the unstableness of the unipolar system. In his 
article he from 1999 he claims that the current unipolar system is prone to peace, and that the 
U.S has no serious challengers for the position as unipole.  
Looking at world order today we can argue that the last notion of Wohlforth‟s view on 
unipolarity has changed. Today the U.S faces significant challengers to its status as the 
world‟s only superpower, with the rise of Japan, China, and India etc. In the multipolar era 
neorealist‟ believes that the security dilemma and the concerns with relative gains will again 
dominate policymakers‟ concerns. In this account a system of multipolarity will be one of 
great power rivalry (Layne 1993: 42).  
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The implications and consequences of the multipolar system is an on-going discussion and the 
results are yet to be seen. U.S is still the most powerful state in the international system, but 
the world order is changing and the multipolar setting does entail new structures significant to 
the behaviour of the systems‟ powerful states.  
Neorealist‟ claims that we have earlier experienced times of both unipolarity and 
multipolarity, therefore the world is constantly moving and as we have seen no type of world 
order is definitive. The argument stresses the importance in looking into the rise and fall of 
great powers and the way the strongest powers in the international system chooses to interact.  
 
 
 
4. Background 
4.1 The Shared History of Russia and China  
“Russia and China are brothers forever” was the tagline of 1950 with the Sino-Russian 
friendship treaty but decades since then the Sino-Russian relations has been marred with 
animosity and suspicion (Wishnick 2001: 798). After the death of Stalin, the difference in 
Russia and China‟s ideological trajectory, personified by Mao and Khrushchev, was the main 
splinter between the countries. Before their split in 1959, the Soviets helped China by 
supplying technical aid,  assistance with their China‟s five-year plan and provided low interest 
loans (Lüthi 2008: 48p & 114ppp). However, this split led to a stark contrast of hostility and a 
stagnated relationship that could be seen in border disputes and closer Chinese relations with 
the US in the 1970s. (Ferdinand 2007: 842) 
Despite this, scholars identify various spurts of positive cooperation between Russia and 
China after the split to highlight the intent of both the nations coming together in an 
agreement. Although USSR signalled its interest to mend its relations earlier, Mikhail 
Gorbachev‟s visit in 1989 signalled reconciliation after their divide (Bellacqua 2010: 15). The 
border demarcation was a major issue between the two that was being discussed in 1991 with 
Russia and China reaffirmed by Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Between 1992 and 
1999 Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin held annual summits that acted as a barometer to the 
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changing scenario in Central Asia. The rhetoric between the two state premiers gradually 
increased from “constructive partnership” to “determining the fate of the 21st century” and 
their communiqués increasingly mentioned “hegemonism”, “unipolarity” and their dedication 
to “multipolarity”. (Wishnick 2001: 799) 
China also looked towards Russia for arms and the modernisation of its army, especially after 
the sanctions by the West in response to the Tiananmen Square incident (Ibid.). Apart from 
the arms, China was even more interested in technological exchange that it was unable to 
secure with western suppliers. In 1992, Russia agreed to transfer technological knowledge 
regarding its inter-continental fighter the SU-27 and several other subsequent contracts that 
now has many Russian experts working in China (Rangsimaporn 2006: 479). At the same 
time, Russia has been selective in the type of technology, like in the case of India that it was 
willing to sell certain military equipment, like Tu-22M, but refused China‟s purchase of the 
same (Bellacqua 2010: 6). China‟s increased military purchases came at an opportune time for 
the Russian defence sector that was struggling after the collapse of the USSR and as off 2011 
China procured 78% of its imported arms from Russia (Holtom et el. 2011: 4). 
Although border issues were not solved, their constant communication relaxed the tensions 
near the borders resulting in de-escalation along the border and increased trade. Such 
communications led to the development of The Agreement on Confidence Building in the 
areas of border areas and military, which led to forum called the Shanghai Five in 1996 
comprising of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan (Jing-Dong 2010: 860). 
This forum later formed the basis for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001 
with the addition of Ukraine (Lanteigne 2007: 609). Russia and China then made a joint 
statement in April 1997 Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the 
Establishment of a New International Order signalling their mutual vision of world order (Lo 
2004: 295) and also signed the an agreement to decrease military forces in the border areas  
(Jing-Dong 2010: 860).  
 In 2001, the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation was signed after 
the previous friendship treaty from 1950 did not get renewed due to prevalent hostility at the 
time of expiry in 1980 (Wishnick 2001: 803). The same year the SCO was formed after 
Uzbekistan‟s inclusion in the Shanghai Five forum and saw an increased multilateral activity 
between Russia and China in the SCO, ASEAN & APEC (Wilhelmsen & Flikke 2001: 87). 
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Apart from approving each other‟s foreign policies Russia and China share similar views on 
the Korean peninsula, Iran and other issues on common platforms. They have furthermore had 
favourable views in the UN leading to less stringent sanctions on North Korea and Iran 
(Wishnick in Bellacqua 2010: 65pp). China and Russia have been seen to cooperate together 
in the UN, the two countries are also a part of the Six-party talks with North Korea and 
cooperate in ASEAN and APEC (Chung 2004: 992).       
Despite the increased cooperation, Putin‟s support for the war on terror waged by the US 
started to strain relations and placing doubts about Russia‟s foreign policy priorities. After 
2003, cracks emerged in Russia‟s western relations, the Sino-Russian relations strengthened 
again. The two countries conducted their first military exercise together in 2005 and 
respectively held “The Year of China” and “The Year of Russia” in each other‟s country in 
2006 & 2007 (Ferdinand 2007: 849pp). Such convergence can be seen in the their vocal and 
repeated vision of multipolarity, denouncing the US‟s lack of respect for state sovereignty 
with Iraq, supporting China‟s policies towards Tibet & Taiwan and Russia‟s approach to 
Chechnya (Lo 2004: 296). This warming of Sino-Russian relations has seen in this decades 
long border disputes being finally solved under these friendly conditions in 2004 and finalised 
in an agreement in 2008. (Kutchins in Ballacqua 2010: 39) 
Trade has been growing between the two countries from the hostile times of 1960s till now. 
The US$2 billion trade of 1985 has increased to almost a volume of US$40 billion in 2008 
(Rozman in Bellacqua 2010: 27). In this robust trade relationship, China still has a US$ 9 
billion (Ballacqua 2010: 7) trade surplus and is the second largest importer of Russian goods 
compared to Russia‟s 9th position as a Chinese importer (Wishnick in Bellacqua 2010: 65). 
Still, China, the largest energy consumer, and Russia, the largest energy producer, have built 
an oil pipeline creating an important link between the two countries (BBC 2011). 
Moreover Russia also has an advantage as an energy producer. In the 1990s, when crude oil 
prices were low, Russia pursued a possible market in China. But, China was hesitant to invest 
in expensive infrastructure and was more interested in exploiting price concessions from 
Russia, thus it was not in a hurry to make long-term binding commitments. The tables turned 
with the surge in oil prices in the beginning of 2000s when China‟s energy demand started 
growing exponentially and Russia found it more lucrative to sell to European customers. This 
reluctance on the part of Russians was also partly influenced by the fear of this energy supply 
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fuelling Chinese rise, therefore now Russia was not very interested in long-term deals. 
(Downs in Bellacqua 2010:146-150) 
However, the global financial recession coinciding with a fall in oil prices that led to a 
breakthrough between the two countries with China lending US$ 25 billion to cash-strapped 
Russian oil companies in exchange for a 20-year supply contract. Russia as of 2005 accounted 
for 11% of Chinese energy imports and that translated to 5% of total Russian exports (Ibid: 
149). The 1,000 barrels/day Russian oil exports of 1995 increased to 292,000 barrels/day in 
2007 (Ibid: 150). The Chinese energy self-sufficiency in 1993 is now part of its history and is 
dependent on imports to meet more than half of its energy demands (Ibid: 148). These imports 
are fulfilled by the Gulf and African countries accounting for 78% combined with the 11% 
from Russia (Ibid: 149). This reliance on the Gulf and African sources is not a cost effective 
solution as shipment through seaways is disreputable. Even the Russian supply is through 
railways leading to similar problems. (Ibid: 151p) 
The energy demand of China solves Russia‟s “security of demand” dilemma by having more 
consumers than its heavy European customer base. Even for China, pipelines are very crucial 
as it means stable, large volume supply and cost effectiveness. This energy relation could be a 
perfectly symbiotic one, but it also has its hurdles in the form of mutual distrust, Chinese 
insistence on below market prices, Russian nationalism towards its resources to name a few.       
Thus, history shows that the two countries share a unique dynamic between them. Historically 
they have had an undulating relationship encompassing collaboration and hostility. In the 
recent past the two countries have accomplished many milestones and new developments in 
their relationship, which have brought them closer. A unified stand on multipolarity, resolving 
border issues, creating a regional forum, increased multilateral activity, increased trade and 
military transfer are some of the highlights that show the increasingly closer relations between 
the two countries. Still, many roadblocks remain in the question of: Russia‟s Western or 
Asian identity, trust among the two nations, foreign policy priorities and regional interests. 
 
  
20 
 
4.2 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation evolved from the former framework of Shanghai 
Five, which was established to facilitate the discussion over border demarcations after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. In 2001, the Shanghai Five became the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation with the inclusion of Uzbekistan. It is as joint collaboration by neighbouring 
states in Central Asia with member states, comprising of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  The organisation also includes four observer states; 
Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, while Belarus and Sri Lanka stand in as 
dialogue partners. 
The SCO outlines its purpose to tackle “The Three Evils” – Terrorism, Extremism & 
Separatism, meanwhile also promoting trade, investment and economic development among 
the member states. The main goals of the SCO, according to its directives, are to:  
“Strengthening mutual trust and good neighbourly friendship among the member 
state; encourage effective cooperation among the member states in political, 
economic and trade scientific and technological, cultural, educational, energy, 
communications, environment, and other fields; devoting themselves jointly to 
preserving and safeguarding regional peace, security and stability; and 
establishing a democratic, fair and rational new international political and 
economic order.” (Declaration of the Establishment of the SCO, 2001) 
The Council of Heads of State is the supreme body, consisting of the presidents of member 
states   that has the power to set agendas for the organisation as well as forming the guidelines 
for the rest of the bodies and they have annual summits, which the member countries host the 
summits in turns. The Council of Heads of Governments also holds an annual summit and its 
primary function is to discuss multi-lateral cooperation strategies and organisational priorities, 
while also approving the budget for the organisation and to ”…consider and decide upon 
major issues related to particular, especially economic, spheres of interaction within the 
Organization” (Ibid. article 6). The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs prepare the 
summits for The Council of Heads of State, and has the authority to make statements on 
behalf of the SCO. Their yearly summit takes place a month prior to one of The Heads of 
State. The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has the responsibility to consider all issues 
that affect the organisations day-to-day activities. The council meets when there is a pressing 
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matter concerning SCO‟s interests, comparable to The European Union‟s Council of 
Ministers.  
The Regional Counter-Terrorist Structure (RCTS), renamed in 2004 to Regional Anti-
Terrorist Structure (RATS), has its own charter, which is signed by all member states July 
2001 in Shanghai and is at the same length as the charter for the foundation of the SCO 
(Bailes et. al 2007: 5). This is a standing body, which is located in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz 
Republic. In the Charter of the SCO it is mentioned that this structure will have its own 
international treaty. RATS has a permanent staff of 30, which are distributed by quota and the 
division of spots in 2007 was; seven from Russia and China, six from Kazakhstan, five from 
Uzbekistan, three from Kyrgyzstan and two from Tajikistan (Ibid: 5p).  
 
The final body of the SCO, located in Beijing, is the secretariat that is the daily administration 
where the permanent 30 staff members (Ibid.). It encompasses an Executive Secretary, 
appointed by the Council of Heads of States, and Executive Secretary Deputies, which are 
appointed by the Council of Foreign Ministers and has to have a different nationality than the 
Executive Secretary. The rest; the Secretariat officials are recruited on a quota basis from the 
member countries. This body is its own organisation and cannot be influenced by the member 
states‟ governments and the secretariat reports only to the SCO. The main objective of the 
Secretariat is written in the Charter of The Shanghai Cooperation, article 11: “It shall provide 
organizational and technical support to the activities carried out in the framework of SCO 
and prepare proposals on the annual budget of the Organization.” (Declaration of the 
Establishment of the SCO, 2001, article 11). 
 
The SCO is based on mutual grounds such as border issue resolution and economic 
development. They outline The Three Evils that currently affect each of the member states 
and actively want to fight it. The SCO‟s adopts a consensus-based decision making process 
and the member states possess equal votes, therefore the smaller countries, like Tajikistan, 
have the same weight as the bigger countries, Russia & China, when deciding in the SCO. 
The charter of SCO refers to many UN charter articles about states supremacy, state 
sovereignty and stress on non-interference in national security and internal affairs, but refrains 
from mentioning the UN charters on human rights and self-determination of the people 
(Bailes et. al 2007: 6). The organisation does not put any weight on democratisation or human 
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rights, thus making no prospects of intervention of SCO in the member states even if there are 
issues regarding human rights etc.  
  
The Three Evils was a consolidating factor for the SCO in coming together. There was a need 
to secure the region‟s stability through tackling The Three Evils and this goal is to be 
executed by RATS. The charters of both SCO and RATS emphasises the importance of states 
sovereignty as described in the UN charter and the agreement within the SCO is that 
interference in national security is out of bounds, the same goes for intervening in internal 
affairs (Ibid: 7). 
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5. Analysis 
The following analysis is divided in two different parts, both seeking to answer the problem 
formulation of this project. The central objective of the analysis is to understand and discuss 
the relationship between Russia and China on the basis of Walt‟s theory Balance of Threats 
and enable us to analyse what a perceived alliance between the actors signifies in the 
discussion of a changing world order and shifts in the global power equilibrium.  
5.1 Identifying the Alliance Behaviour of Russia and China within the SOC 
The objective of this part of the analysis is to dissect and discus the relationship between 
Russia and China, highlighted by their engagement in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation. Applying Walt‟s theoretical framework on alliance behaviour enables us to 
characterise the sources of threats compatible with the issues within the Central Asian region 
and thus the SCO. Furthermore Walt‟s hypotheses on alliance behaviours shines a light on the 
power balance between the two main actors Russia and China and the challenges this entails, 
but the hypotheses also defines the objectives of the smaller member states of the SCO.   
The structure of this analysis attacks the issues of threats from a different perspective than the 
structure of Walt‟s in his theory from 1987. Walt conducted his research in the Middles East 
in a time of Cold War between the world‟s two only superpowers. His hypotheses on 
balancing and bandwagoning behaviour are therefore focused on an objective of how states in 
the Middle East would seek to align themselves with each other and with or against one of the 
two superpowers. In our case, we are investigating an already formed “alliance” between 
sovereign states. As a result of this we have chosen to focus on some main components, 
which constitute the states cooperation within the SCO. These components are all in some 
aspects compatible with Walt‟s identification of different sources of threat, which he 
perceives as important factors for the way states choose to align. The different components 
and the different sources of threat therefore form the foundation from which we will identify 
and discuss the motives behind Russia and China‟s engagement in the SCO. This foundation 
will furthermore enable us to discuss the alliance behaviour within the SCO. On this account 
we apply Walt‟s hypotheses on balancing behaviour in a way, where we not only perceive it 
as states balancing against a specific threat but also as behaviour of balancing with other 
states to secure common motives.  
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The results from this part of the analysis will be further processed in the second part, where 
we seek to give a more comprehensive analysis on the relationship between Russia and China 
and discuss how this relationship affects world order and the world‟s power equilibrium.  
The components, which in our perspective, constitute the collaborations between the member 
states of the SCO are as follows;  
Border Issues  
One of the basic motives for establishing the SCO is as mentioned to solve the border issues 
of the region. Russia and China have struggled with border issues both with each other and 
the other bordering countries in the region. Viewing this theme from Walt‟s theoretical 
framework, it is possible to identify some main sources of threat affecting the alliance 
behaviour of Russia and China within the SCO. Walt‟s perception on geographic proximity is 
to a high degree compatible with the border conflicts, because it establishes that nearby states 
poses a greater threat than those that are further away. Additionally his take on intentions and 
the significance of aggregate power also come into play when discussing the theme of border 
issues.    
From the perspective of Russia, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to several new 
issues it had to tackle, of which border settlements were one of the biggest. Its primary focus 
was to minimise disruptions created by the dismantling of the Soviet state (Buszynski 
2004:160). It since tried to consolidate the breakaway areas with the creation of 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991 comprising of 12 former Soviet states 
(Ibid.). Six of these states signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992, which materialised 
into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2003, which included all the SCO 
members except China (Ibid: 161). This can be seen as Russia‟s attempt at extending control, 
previously enjoyed by the Soviet Union, and ensuring a stable and friendly region (Ibid). This 
interest is further exhibited by the apparent loss of influence highlighted by the existence of 
various factions such as GUAM, comprised of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, 
which is seen to be Western-oriented and vying for US, EU & NATO ties (Ibid.). Even the 
CIS, despite annual meetings and declarations has failed to exist as a coherent organisation. 
Such polarisation of orientation, between the West and Russia, and inefficient consolidation 
in the region invigorates Russia‟s border insecurities (Ibid: 163). In this notion Walt‟s take on 
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geographic proximity becomes a clear motive for Russia engaging in the SCO. When having 
difficulties in containing a nearby threat, Walt would argue for either balancing or 
bandwagoning, in Russia position as described above its alliance behaviour tips towards 
bandwagoning with the SCO despite its great power status. However in relation to certain 
Central Asian countries, like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan & Tajikistan, the status quo has 
prevailed. Scholars have credited the authoritarian regimes of the region for the stability and 
comfort Russia has felt. Furthermore Russia did not have to compete with serious NATO, EU 
or US influence in this region, with the exception of Uzbekistan during 2001 to 2005 (Bailes 
et. al. 2007: 10). 
From a Russian perspective, solving its border issues with China is of most importance 
because of China‟s rise as a super power. During the Soviet Era, USSR was seen as the “big 
brother” guiding the new Chinese government, but in the post-soviet period the relations 
changed into a more equal standing among the two (Kutchins in Bellacqua 2010: 34). Russia 
and China continued to have their decade long border disputes until 2004. These disputes 
were a splinter in Russian and Chinese relations, but both sides understood the importance of 
non-aggression, thus not aggravating tensions. The two states prioritised confidence building 
and demilitarisation of the border regions through agreements in 1996 and 2001. Such actions 
can be explained through Walt‟s framework, as the two countries possess large aggregate and 
offensive power, which are hard to rank between them, such an uneven threat projections of 
both actors works as deterrence to aggressive actions. So diplomacy between the two states 
can be seen as an effort to balance each other in a softer manner than using hard power. With 
the resolution of the border disputes in 2004, Russia and China decided to divide control of 
the river islands in question (Fravel 2005: 63p). Although, mostly balancing behaviour is 
observed, China‟s willingness to compromise also shows bandwagoning traits. The following 
quote shows some of China‟s motives in resolving the dispute-   “As no internal threats to 
regime security preceded this agreement, China’s compromise most likely stemmed from 
external factors, especially the need to deepen ties with Russia.” (Fravel 2005: 63p)  This 
shows China‟s pragmatic stance and willingness to slightly bandwagon for larger relative 
gains. This does not imply that Russia is the stronger of the two actors, but does possess 
advantages in certain capabilities that interests China. 
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 Russia continuously struggled with many territorial problems with almost all its bordering 
countries, but Central Asia remained manageable even though problems were not instantly 
solved. Apart from political-border issues, the region is still struck by many separatist 
movements that pose as a mutual threat to the SCO countries.  
Thus this characteristic of the region can be seen as a motive for Russia engaging in the 
framework to consolidate the region, its border problems and also tackle the separatist 
struggles. Such intentions so far have resulted in many milestones such as The Agreement on 
Confidence Building coinciding with the Shanghai Five and the Treaty of Good-
Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation timed with the establishment of the SCO. It can 
be argued that Russia engages in a balancing behaviour with the other SCO members, 
especially China, to ensure the stability of the region.  
China, being the third largest area in the world (Shen 2012), with joint borders with its 14 
neighbouring countries, has also a history of border tensions within the region. China and 
Russia have had their share of bordering tensions specifically regarding islands in the 
bordering rivers Usuri, Amur and Argun. Their disputes originated from an unfairly handled 
treaty signing over the islands to Russia in the past, according to the Chinese. Disputes also 
arose in Xinjiang Uygher, an autonomous region, which borders the now, Tajikistani republic. 
As mentioned, discussions regarding these disputes have continued from the establishment of 
the Shanghai Five into SCO where the focus on solving these problems was strengthened 
(Ibid.). 
For China one central issue is the Xinjiang region, which can be characterised as China‟s 
“problem child”. It is surrounded by three Central Asian states and it harbours the biggest 
gatherings of separatists in China and consists of 1/6 of China‟s territory (Harris 1993: 111). 
After the Soviet Union‟s collapse China feared that the break up could foster an even stronger 
separatist movement affecting Xinjiang as well. Out of the Chinese government‟s official 
reply to the instability one can see its emphasis on the role of external factors and the 
importance of economic development in the region for stability and national unity (Ibid: 116). 
This leads to the argument towards a unified region expressed in the following quote:  
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“China knows that how it manages Central Asian relationships will have a 
profound significance for security inside China as well as for the future of its 
relations with Russia, Turkey, the Middle East and South Asia” (Harris 1993: 
112).  
The quote stresses that the way for China to solve its issues with Xinjiang is by securing 
cooperation on this issue within the region. Walt‟s theory is compatible with this argument on 
the aspect of aggressive intentions. As argued in the situation with Russia, China must project 
an attitude of benevolence and non-aggressive intentions in order to secure the alignment with 
the other member states.  
The region Xinjiang harboured in 1993 the biggest unexploited natural-resource basin in 
China and is therefore an extremely important and strategic area for China to stabilise and 
secure it from any domestic or international threats. When the Central Asian countries 
emerged in 1991 China was promptly out to acknowledge their existence to ensure a 
diplomatic and prosperous cooperation on solving the border issues and instigate a joint battle 
against the separatists (Jing-Dong 2010: 857).  
In this instance China showed willingness to compromise regarding the disputed lands. These 
compromises outline the Chinese agenda to pursue a peaceful and economically prosperous 
region to enforce stability and cooperation (Fravel 2005: 56). In 1998 a treaty between 
Kazakhstan and China was signed resulting in a lucrative deal for both parties. China invested 
in a large oil field in Kazakhstan as a long-term investment and China has also offered 900 
million US$ for low-interest loans as a token of its friendship with the Central Asian countries 
(Jing-Dong 2010: 858). Even though the loans dose not amount to too much compared to 
other Chinese investments, it can be argued that the recipients perceived this amount as a 
grand gesture. 
All of the above shows the Chinese motives for engaging in the SCO. China realised the need 
for an intervention on the separatist issue by cooperating with the bordering countries to end 
territorial disputes and enhance the region economically with trade agreements. With The 
Shanghai Five, China engaged in cooperation, as they had set out to do in the early 1990s. As 
mentioned earlier the central issues of border disputes were carried on in the establishment of 
the SCO.  
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From Walt‟s perspective China and Russia are trying to eliminate the threats of the 
separatists, extremists and terrorists that cause instability in the region. These threats are due 
to what Walt identifies as geographical proximity, because of the instability being an effect of 
a nearby threat in the region, which challenges Chinas domestic “harmony” as well as 
Russia‟s regional relations. Russia and China‟s engagement in the SCO can therefore be 
viewed as an attempt to balance the threats, that rivalling border disputes give rise to. On the 
issue of border disputes, the same threats are present throughout the region, and as noted 
above neither Russia nor China can solve these issues by themselves. Therefore the efforts in 
solving border disputes can, as one of the few aspects within the SCO, be seen as a balancing 
act between all member states. Cooperation with the smaller member states is essential to both 
Russia and China and the motives for both actors to act cautious in projecting aggressive 
intentions are obvious when using Walt‟s terminology; when balancing appears to be the 
trend in the world, aggressive intentions will foster animosity towards the aggressive states 
and states will most likely balance against the aggressor.  
Solving the border issues is of great importance for both Russia and China, because a stable 
and peaceful region would create a prosperous environment for both actors to increase their 
aggregate powers. From the perspective of Walt one could argue that such an increase, 
especially an uneven one, could once again incite tensions between the two powers. Walt 
would argue that the greater a state‟s aggregate power is, the greater potential threat it can 
pose to others. This argument stresses once again that both actors should behave with non-
aggression if they wish to maintain their peaceful relations within the SCO. 
 
The Three Evils – Separatism, Terrorism and Extremism  
One of the fundamental pillars of the SCO is the member states‟ agreement on countering The 
Three Evils. The agreement constitutes the foundation of the security cooperation between 
SCO‟s member states. Tackling The Three Evils is the primary source of coordination and 
collaboration within the member states, and each member state must address these threats to 
ensure stability and security both within their own borders and in the region (Aris 2009: 466). 
In Walt‟s alliance logic, the obvious behaviour for states facing threats like The Three Evils 
would be to align with each other to balance against the common threat.  
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The establishment of the SCO, with a focus on The Three Evils, can be perceived as Russia 
and China‟s need of cooperation on three common threats. China, Russia and the other 
member states are struggling with separatist groups, religious extremism and terrorist 
activities (Ryan in Bellacqua 2010: 188). As noted earlier one of China‟s main motives for 
joining the SCO was the preoccupation with the instability in Central Asia and in the Xinjiang 
region. They all struggle with The Three Evils, and in a Chinese perspective, battling the 
separatists is essential to domestic and regional stability. The SCO is founded on the notion of 
non-interference in internal affairs. The interpretation of The Three Evils is of such broadness 
that they offer significant range for the member states to label any regional disturbances under 
this banner. This enables the SCO members to legitimately act with force against any 
opposition, which could fall into the range of the broad interpretation (Aris 2009: 465pp). 
According to the theory of Walt the above shows balancing tendencies between Russia and 
China hence they are aligning together as two great powers against a common regional threat. 
Additionally, it can be argued that the smaller member states are bandwagoning with China 
and Russia, because smaller states bordering great powers usually are more vulnerable and are 
therefore drawn to the powerful states for security. One can therefore argue that the smaller 
states of the SCO will stand better against The Three Evils when bandwagoning with China 
and Russia.    
From a Russian perspective, as noted earlier, the authoritarian governments bordering Russia 
have provided the fore mentioned status quo of political stability. Therefore it would 
automatically be in Russia‟s interest to thwart any possible disturbance of the status quo in the 
governments of the SCO.  
The threat of The Three Evils is meant to be tackled by RATS, whose primary function is to 
exchange intelligence among the SCO countries. The fact that the countries join together 
within RATS shows strengthened regional relations. The SCO intelligence mechanism is just 
a supplement to the existing intelligence network between Russia and the former soviet 
republics, their exchange of information with China is said to be not as efficient due to 
mistrust (Aris 2009: 471). The trust to share intelligence is of vital importance for the Chinese 
to be able to tackle problems they prioritise.   
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When analysing the relationship between the member states of the SCO through the threats of 
The Three Evils, the motive of being able to balance these threats stand clear. Both balancing 
and bandwagoning behaviour can be traced within the SCO. Russia and China being the two 
great powers attracts the smaller, and more vulnerable, states in the quest to alleviate their 
common threat of The Three Evils. The collaboration between Russia and China can be 
viewed as a balancing act, while the smaller states‟ behaviour can be viewed as 
bandwagoning when applying Walt‟s theory. As on the account of border issues it is again the 
source of threat of geographic proximity that is in evidence when discussing the theme of The 
Three Evils. 
Military  
When analysing alliance formation the concept of military is unavoidable. Walt‟s definition of 
alliances refers to arrangements of security between states, which to a high degree is aligned 
with concepts of military prowess. Therefore, when discussing the motives for Russia and 
China‟s engagement in the SCO, the military prowess of each actor becomes a significant 
component in understanding Sino-Russian relations. Within Walt‟s theoretical framework, 
military is highly compatible with his definition of aggregate power and offensive power as 
sources of threat.  
Russia‟s interest of regional relevance is closely tied to its military sphere. The arms industry 
formed a support for the economy and most of its clients were former Soviet-allies. In the 
1990s the dwindling economy was not helped by plummeting purchases from the Warsaw 
pact countries. In a bid to rebuild this industry, when Russia looked towards its traditional 
partners, it was faced with the new reality of them looking towards Europe, NATO or the US. 
Also the suspicion of the Soviet-era lingered into the post-collapse times making it harder for 
Russia to be trusted. (Kobrinskaya & Litavrin in Anthony 1998:182ppp) 
The Soviet Union was a big consumer of its own arms, but its collapse changed this trend. 
Russia inherited 80% of USSR‟s defence industry but still had to cut down on domestic arms 
procurement (Śmigielski 2010: 248). This was credited to the fact that more than 70% of 
Russia‟s defence budget was allocated for maintenance of the armed forces (Pyadushkin et. al. 
2003: 3). The 4.3 million Soviet troops of 1986 stood around a million in 2011. Despite this 
seemingly drastic change in numbers, the Russian army is still thought of to be formidable. A 
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significant development was that as of 2005, the domestic arms orders have returned to the 
Soviet trend by surpassing the total arms exports (Westerlund in Pallin 2012: 68).  A Russian 
reform launched in 2008 aimed to reduce the armed forces to a strength of 1 million (Nichol 
2012: I) and introduce US$700 billion worth of modernisation between the period of 2011-
2020 (Ibid: 21). The modernisation plan is characterised as strengthening its nuclear 
deterrence while improving conventional arms by a US Congressional Report: 
 “…prioritizes the procurement of new missiles and platforms to maintain 
strategic nuclear deterrence, but also includes new planes, helicopters, ships, 
missiles, and submarines for the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, and other arms 
of service.” (Nichol 2012: 21).  
When China emerged onto the market of international arms trade in the 1980s, many Western 
countries gladly flocked to this new market but this supply was disrupted by embargoes 
followed by the Tiananmen incident. As mentioned earlier the relationship eased between 
China and Russia after Gorbachev‟s visit to Beijing in 1989 – this became the start of a new 
closer relationship.  
After these warmer ties, post the Sino-Soviet split and Tiananmen Square incident, China and 
Russia became closer arms trading partners, as China became a growing customer and Russia 
a source for modern arms and technology. Apart from many Research and Development 
(R&D) projects between the two countries, China more importantly received technological 
knowhow and license to produce the SU-27 inter-continental jet-fighter in 1995 (Donaldson 
& Donaldson 2003: 715). The US$1.4 billion received in exchange was said to have been 
crucial for the Russian defence industry and was supposed to be used for the development of a 
new aircraft but others thought it to be a major blunder at the hands of the Russian negotiators 
(Ibid). Despite concerns over empowering an adversary, Chinese purchases did help the 
Russian military sector. China is one of the most important military trading partners of Russia 
and between 2007 and 2011 China was the second largest recipient of Russian arms, 
combined with India accounted for 50% of total Russian exports (Holtom et al. 2011: 3).           
China‟s primary concern over the years was to modernise its armed forces. In 1994, China 
reportedly owned 10,000 main-battle tanks but most were outdated and based on Soviet 
designs from the 1950s. Before, Sino-Russian military cooperation resumed China also had 
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5000 obsolete combat aircrafts such as MiG-19 and despite modernisation attempts the 
Chinese Air Force only introduced models such as the Shenyang J-8 II, which still lagged 
behind the capabilities of other air forces. The absence of modern technology in the Chinese 
armed forces showed how far they lagged behind in their military capabilities in comparison 
to international powers. It was only after the Russians started exporting their fighter jets, of 
the likes of SU-27 fighters and a new class of bombers to replace the old Chinese fleet that the 
analysts credit the leap in capabilities to imports like these. Although it also has to be kept in 
mind that Russia refused to sell some important items like the SU-35 fighters or supersonic 
TU-22m, requested by China (Sergounin and Sergey in Anthony 1998: 205-210). 
Thus the need to modernise China‟s military forces was only realised with Russian assistance. 
But, this increase in capability also troubles many within Russia as it sees China as a potential 
adversary. Despite declining imports of China and increased exports, many still claim that 
China is in need of Russian help to develop further. Therefore it is in Chinese interest to make 
this technological-partner feel secure about its growth to continue gaining access to Russian 
knowhow, which can be achieved through closer cooperation in the SCO. 
The large offensive capability of the Soviet Union is unquestionable, thus Russia inheriting 
most of this capability does provide it with similar offensive power. One can argue that the 
turmoil of the collapse, outdated arms and transitioning due to reforms would have a negative 
effect on Russia‟s projected offensive power. But, this source of threat still remains constant 
with visible plans of modernisation and strengthening of nuclear deterrence. As for China, one 
can see the leap in capabilities as an increase in their threat projection through a greater 
offensive power. Their 2.1 million troops and nuclear capability can be seen at par with 
Russia‟s, but the technological and strategic strengths of Russia can be said to neutralise the 
additional manpower and significantly lower nuclear arsenal of China.  
Thus, Walt would categorise Russia‟s offensive power higher than China‟s. Although such 
assessments are more complex, the historical and technological head start of Russia does 
provide available indicators. Walt would further emphasise that Russia would be a clear threat 
to China, especially when factoring in the geographical proximity of the two countries, and 
that China would be inclined to balance against it by aligning with other states threatened by 
Russia. These concerns do exist in the Russian and Chinese political spheres, but other 
dependence such as energy, finances and trade are also factors that dilute the threat projected 
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by the offensive power of Russia. Also, the key cooperation in the arms trade between the two 
countries instils more confidence in the relationship, combined with the intentional 
technological gap Russia maintains is another calming factor.          
In spite of the slowing purchases from the former Soviet countries, Russia still maintained a 
market for spare parts and replacements as most of these countries continued their use of 
Russian origin military technology. Additionally the main market for arms now lies beyond 
some of the former Soviet countries because the Central Asian countries do not account for 
more than 1% of world arms imports (Holtom et al. 2011: 6).           
In terms of military presence, the CSTO has allowed Russia a degree of free hand in the 
signatory countries, meaning it still has troops deployed in many of the bases of the SCO. 
Russia also shows its willingness for increased cooperation between the SCO and the CSTO 
to help fight the fundamental mutual threat of the SCO: The Three Evils (Bailes et. al. 2007: 
10).     
Thus the SCO is beneficial for Russia to build confidence among the countries of the region 
that have had suspicion and mistrust carried forward from the Soviet era and rectify it. Closer 
military involvement through SCO and CSTO could promote the region subscribing more to 
Russian arms and closer ties to China enables Russia to provide it with arms without having 
to be insecure about China‟s rise.  
The clear offensive power of Russia does project a threat to the region, but the close 
cooperation and confidence-building measures provides for a stable region. It is important to 
include the fact the significance of China as an importer, trading partner and its financing 
power still is relevant. Despite difficulties in being able to assess the Chinese military 
capabilities, it is also an unavoidable offensive power threat. The geographic proximity of 
these two does pose a large threat in a neorealist world. Thus, SCO becomes an effective 
balancing act for Russia and China to manage the threat each of them project, while the 
remaining states bandwagon along with Russia and China as their significance from a military 
respect is low.         
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Economic Integration 
When viewing economic integration as a central motive for the establishment of the SCO, it is 
possible to identify different perspectives on how this theme affects Russia and Chinas 
relations. Analysing this from Walt‟s theoretical perspective, his notions of aggregate power 
and aggressive intensions is to a high degree compatible with this theme and relevant to the 
discussion of the relationship between Russia and China. 
After the end of the Cold War Russia declined as a Superpower and had to reinvent itself in 
the face of new domestic, regional and global political-economic realities. Russia has 
emerged as an international energy supplier and a rising political power, which has led to 
economic prosperity. This development can, in relation to the theory by Walt, be 
characterised as a strengthening of Russian aggregated power. During Russia‟s re-emergence 
there have not been many compelling reasons for internationalisation of Russia‟s economy 
through cooperation, thus when identifying patterns under Putin‟s administration it is not 
surprising to discover elements of protectionism and economic self-sufficiency (Zhuplev 
2008: 100pp). Having this is mind while looking into the motives behind Russia‟s 
engagement in the SCO reveals some hesitance from Russia in the arena of economic 
cooperation. The aggregated power of Russia is challenged when looking at the combined 
economic capabilities in the SCO. In opposition to Russia, China stands in a powerful 
economic position with a high level of aggregated power and strong self-confidence. Trade 
between China and the states of Central Asia have expanded from US$ 459 million in 1992 to 
US$ 30 billion in 2008 (Jing-Dong 2010: 859). The Chinese economic interest in Central Asia 
is a hope for a future, which will enhance trade in the region. In this instance China wants to 
position itself as being the responsible financial provider as well as the one providing the land 
routes for the product flow, making Central Asia a market for Chinese consumer goods 
(Ibid.). One can from this argue that when observing the aggregated power, which indeed is 
influenced significantly by economy, China has to some degree the upper hand in the region. 
From a perspective of Russia and the other member states of the SCO this entails high levels 
of interest in Chinese investments. On this account, using Walt‟s take on alliance behaviour, it 
can be argued that the actors of the SCO including Russia shows some bandwagoning 
tendencies.  
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Nevertheless, Russia and China are the two strongest economies within the SCO and patterns 
show increasing integration between the two economies (Lotspeich in Bellacqua 2010: 115). 
The two primary sources of trade are armaments and energy in return for Chinese investments 
(Ibid: 89). The establishment of SCO has enhanced agreements on bilateral trade and 
negotiations on oil production between China and Russia (Trotskiy in Bailes 2007: 33). The 
need for Chinese investments can be perceived as Russia‟s strong wish to grow without over-
dependence on the West (Bailes et. al. 2007: 10p). When discussing economic integration 
between Russia and China, Walt‟s notion on perception of intent is applicable to the situation.  
From this perspective it can be argued that increasing economic integration between the actors 
do dependent on them to perceive each other‟s intentions and motives as being co-operative 
and non-aggressive. As mentioned the motives of economic integration is central to both 
actors due to co-dependence on resources and investments. In spite of this co-dependence 
between the two economies, one can identify some conflict on the subject of trade within the 
SCO.  
China envisions a free-trade zone within the area of the SCO to strengthen further economic 
integration between the member states. Russia rejected this proposal, but it did endorse a 
framework agreement on enhanced economic cooperation in September 2003 (Troitskiy in 
Bailes 2007: 32). Still Russia remains hesitant about an agreement that would open up trade 
even further, because of its ambivalent attitude towards China. Russia is in a situation where a 
free-trade zone within the SCO area would benefit the Russian economy, but at the same time 
have consequences for Russia‟s own ambitions with its engagement in the SCO because of 
the leverage the agreement would give China. In the SIPRI article China‟s great power 
position is highlighted in the economic treaties of SCO, because China‟s contributions surpass 
that of any of the other member states (Guang in Bailes 2007: 49). Even though China has 
established a great economic position it still needs to nurture the relationship with its fellow 
member states. Therefore China is very interested in economic integration with Central Asia. 
Removing trade barriers are a central motive behind China‟s engagement in the SCO (Panda 
2012: 517). Making SCO a free-trade zone would have been a beneficial move for China, but 
Russia fears that with an agreement like this, China‟s already massive economic pressure will 
exceed to complete economic penetration in all of Central Asia and give China the leading 
position within the SCO (Troitskiy in Bailes 2007: 42). Due to China‟s economic pressure in 
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Central Asia, Russia favours establishing a free-trade zone within the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EURASEC), consisting of the other SCO member states; Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, to bypass the inclusion of China (Ibid: 34p). This 
dilemma exemplifies once again the importance of what Walt refers to as perceived intensions 
but also the significance of differences in levels of aggregate power. Russia is hesitant and 
feels, to some extent, threatened by China‟s economic power and presence, which led them to 
turn down the free-trade zone within the SCO. With this it can also be argued that Russia 
sends a signal to China of mistrust, highlighted with its efforts in establishing a free-trade 
zone within the EURASEC. 
Arguing from Walt‟s perspective, this puts China in a position where it will need to be careful 
on how its intentions and attitude is perceived by Russia and the remaining members of the 
SCO if it wants to achieve its goals of free trade within the SCO. It can be argued that 
succeeding on this account is a main interest of China‟s due to the possibility of increasing its 
aggregate power.   China‟s apparent position as the strongest economic actor within the SCO 
puts it in an ambiguous position when seeking to align and cooperate with other actors due to 
different sources of threats its position entails. It is especially in China‟s interest to strengthen 
the economic bond between itself and remaining Central Asian states as expressed in the 
following quote: “A strong linkage (…) between China's Western Development Strategy and 
its pursuit of the SCO as a platform for trade and economic cooperation with the region.” 
(Panda 2012: 518). It can be argued from this quote that the motives behind China engaging 
in the SCO are based on economic trade and can be summarised below. Even though China is 
an established financial power, it is still in its interest to have a healthy relationship towards 
the other member states of the SCO and the remaining states of Central Asia. 
From an economic perspective it is quite interesting to discuss how to define the relationship 
between China and Russia. If one were only to define this relationship through the economic 
perspective one would be tempted to argue, that Russia‟s alliance behaviour can be perceived 
as bandwagoning with China, because of its dependence on Chinese investments. Though, 
Russia‟s efforts towards establishing a free-trade zone with EURASEC, instead of the SCO, 
can be seen as Russia trying to strengthen its aggregated power, so it will be able to balance 
instead of bandwagoning. However to be able to fully understand the alliance behaviour 
between the two actors, the motives of energy trade gives a significant contribution to the 
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understanding of Sino-Russian relations. Though on the account of economic integration it 
can furthermore be argued, that behaviour of balancing between Russia and China can be 
identified. The co-dependence between the two actors‟ demands an act of balancing and the 
awareness from both actors on how their attitudes and intentions are perceived by one another 
is crucial for further cooperation.  
Energy Trade  
The theme of energy trade plays a significant role when identifying the motives behind Russia 
and China engaging in the SCO. Though the actors take different positions on this account it 
reveals some of the core components of their relations. Walt‟s notions on aggregate power 
and geographic proximity as sources of threat come in to play, when looking into the 
dynamics of energy trade within the region of Central Asia.  
Russia‟s waning influence and economy of the 1990s proved to be a big challenge for the 
country. It lost most of its amassed influence of the Soviet Union and its economy was not 
helped by a dip in arms demand and low oil prices. Both the economy and political influence 
saw resurgence with the turn of the new century with oil prices increasing and the 
transforming of the market from a buyer‟s one to a seller‟s. The Central Asian region is an 
important one for Russia due to the presence of oil and gas reserve in the other countries, but 
also the increasing demand of China is a prominent factor. Russia has viewed its oil and gas 
resources as a foreign policy tool to influence importers and with the rise in prices it has 
increasingly been able to do so. More importantly due to China‟s close proximity and its 
growth Russia has gained additional leverage with such an evident high demand base. It is of 
particular Russian interest to secure this demand and not be overly relying on EU importers, 
and furthermore have an advantage while negotiating prices with all its clients. (Downs in 
Bellacqua: 146pp)  
This vast energy reserve of Russia helps boost its aggregate power, seen through Walt‟s 
optics, and is a significant contributing variable to its power projection. As the largest energy 
producer Russia commands a vast resource needed by many countries but this same control 
can be perceived as a threat by countries reliant on Russian energy supply.   
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China is of further interest to Russia as it is a source for financial capital to Russian energy 
companies that have been unable to secure such capital from Western institutions. Russian 
energy companies such as Rosneft and Transneft have benefitted from loans to the tune of 
US$25 billion from Chinese banks. Chinese financial assistance has helped in the expansion 
of these cash-strapped companies, especially when the companies were struggling with 
raising capital. In turn, China has received permission to build the pipeline-spur linking to the 
ESPO pipeline and 20 years of oil supply (Ibid: 156pp). The similarly placed aggregate power 
of Russia and China come into play here when they exchange resources benefiting each other 
in a form of symbiotic balancing. Using Walt‟s perspective, one could argue that this 
symbiotic relationship might pose as a threat to energy clients in the West, who are interested 
in Russian energy supply. This threat could also seem greater as the symbiotic relationship 
between Russia and China combines the aggregate power threat of two important global 
actors. Such threat projection might aggravate tensions in current beneficial relations Russia 
enjoys with the West. If this Sino-Russian cooperation were to seem too aggressive in its 
intentions, Walt would also argue that Russia would risk the West aligning against it to 
balance this perceived threat.      
The smaller countries of the SCO are also of interest to Russia due to supply concerns. 
Russian companies such as Gazprom work closely with KazMunaiGas, Kazakhstan's state-
owned company, and Russia has tried to persuade Kazakhstan to double its oil supply through 
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline. However, concerns regarding long-term 
commitments exist with Kazakhstan‟s hesitance to materialise such agreements as it tries to 
pursue non-Russian pipelines to deliver oil to EU (Blagov 2010). Already these energy-rich 
countries export to Russia to help them fulfil their commitments but Russia would further like 
to consolidate their relationship and secure this energy supply.  
When identifying motives behind Russia‟s engagement in the SCO from the perspective of 
energy trade one can argue that SCO provides Russia a platform to consolidate its energy 
partners. Through cooperation in the SCO, Russia aims at building confidence among the 
smaller energy suppliers for closer cooperation in the supply chain. Additionally, develop 
better understanding and cooperation with a large energy consumer like China for its 
financing and large demand. 
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When observing energy trade in relation to China, Russia and the remaining SCO members, it 
can be established that oil and gas is central for their cooperation. As a rising power China 
faces challenges with a growing population, which makes China the biggest energy consumer 
in the world (Watts 2010). Therefore their self-sufficiency of 1993 is now part of history and 
China is now dependent on imports to meet more than half of its energy demands. Russia is 
the largest energy producer, which makes Russia a beneficial trading partner in meeting 
China‟s demands. It can therefore be argued that China‟s immense need for resources 
becomes a significant motive for engaging in the SCO hence the SCO is a lucrative platform 
for energy trading between its member states.  
China has become very interested in the energy resources within Central Asia to provide the 
necessary resources for their rapid economic growth (Jing-Dong 2010: 859p). The interest 
already existed in 1997 when China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) purchased 60% 
of an oil company in Kazakhstan (Ibid.). The Xinjiang region, which borders to Russia, 
Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, is very 
important when looking into the aspect of energy trade and resources. Xinjiang is of great 
importance to China because of its key strategic location and the fact that the region possesses 
China‟s largest petroleum reserves. However as mentioned the region is considered unstable 
because conflicts concerning separatist issues impact the relationship between the region and 
the rest of China. Therefore China‟s quest for energy security depends on the stability in 
Xinjiang (Panda 2012: 517).  The instability of this region has a large impact on the energy 
supply to the Chinese, which in turn affects its projected aggregated power. Furthermore the 
proximity of separatist forces to the SCO members acts as a unifying goal to balance against it 
in the welfare of its energy interests.     
The motives for China engaging in the SCO are quite clear when it comes to the energy 
perspective. The consumption of China grows increasingly and so does its need for resources. 
China‟s difficulty with Xinjiang stresses its needs for stronger cooperation on the energy 
aspect within the SCO. What is striking when looking into China‟s cooperation pattern on this 
aspect are China‟s efforts in avoiding having Russia as its main trading partner. Compared to 
the single Sino-Russian pipeline, China has several agreements with other SCO members. 
Among others worth mentioning is the 2009 collaboration with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 
which launched the world‟s longest pipeline. This has strengthened the security and political 
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cooperation within the SCO (Panda 2012: 520). This issue is worth noticing because it signals 
a reserved Chinese behaviour towards Russia in this field of cooperation. However, 
scepticism from a Russian perspective should not be overlooked when discussing Russia‟s 
willingness to enhance China‟s rise.   
The SCO thus provides a platform for Russia and China to balance each other‟s aggregate 
threat and capabilities, especially in the sphere of energy. The organisation can furthermore be 
seen as a balancing act against the energy interests of the West due to the region‟s vast energy 
supply and demand. The availability of highly demanded resources increases the involved 
parties‟ aggregate power. Also, the ability to partially absorb this energy output through 
China‟s industrial growth decreases the dependence on external actors that keeps the 
aggregate power constant, if not increases it. The geographical proximity of separatist threats 
also acts as a common denominator motivating the SCO members to balance against it. 
Within the SCO, one can argue that Russia and China act in a more symbiotic fashion by 
exchanging resources. The remaining SCO members bandwagon with Russia and China to 
uplift its aggregate power on the world stage, but they also bandwagon within the SCO to 
benefit from China‟s demand. Additionally, the Chinese energy import from the smaller SCO 
states shows its interest in being able to balance against the perceived threat of Russian energy 
dominance. On the aspect of energy trade, the SCO‟s behaviour can be primarily categorised 
as a balancing act within the organisation but can also be perceived as a means for the SCO 
countries to balance against market pressures applied by the West. 
The Motives on Identity and Self-image  
When identifying the motives behind Russia and China‟s engagement in the SCO, the account 
of identity and self-image is significant because it constitutes the basic structure of the actors. 
Though it is not measurable like economic development, resources or military capabilities, it 
is, according to Walt‟s alliance theory, a significant factor when states choose to align. 
Therefore Walt‟s notion on perceptions of intent is compatible with the account of identity 
and self-image when analysing the alliance behaviour of Russia and China within the SCO.   
Russian national identity has suffered a great amount of turmoil in modern times. With the 
end of the Cold War, Russia had to recover from an extended power plunge and had to 
disclaim its identity as a super power. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Russia‟s 
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loss of geopolitical power in Central Asia, Russia was forced to rediscover and redesign the 
“Russian idea” as former President Boris Yeltsin announced it (Rozman in Bellaqua 2010: 
20). Russia was forced to find its way back to great power status in a world where the US was 
declared the victor and therefore the unipolar power in the international system.  
Some central issues play a significant role in Russia‟s task of redefining its identity; their 
geographical position, relations with its neighbours to the west and to the east and its desire 
for recognition. Russia had to steer its way forward in an environment where both its relations 
to the US and the West alongside with a growing relationship with China are of great 
significance, and furthermore where tensions between the US and China, also affected Russia 
positioning of itself (Lo 2004: 304). When being in a position of having to redefine oneself 
after loss of power status, Walt‟s threat perception on aggressive intentions is applicable 
when looking into the attitudes the actors of SCO projects, which furthermore can reveal 
perspectives of the alliance behaviour within SCO. 
When being in the position of Russia and China, how they are perceived by its neighbours in 
Central Asia and towards the West is essential when attracting alliance partners as well as 
stable and peaceful surroundings.  
Russia‟s geographical position squeezes Russia in between the developed West and the 
developing East in Central and Southeast Asia, which enables Russia to build ties with many 
different actors. Russia is in a position that is both unique and challenging as it shares historic 
and collaborative ties with the West, it is also close connected with events and common 
struggles in the region of Central Asia (Ibid: 299).  
In the beginning of the 21
st
 century under Putin‟s administration, Russia announced that its 
foreign policies should be based on the premise that “Russia can be friends with all 
countries”. This has resulted in functional relations with the US, major European states, a 
strategic partnership with Beijing, strong influence in the former Soviet Union countries and 
ties to the Islamic World (Ibid: 300p). From this account one can argue that Russia projects an 
attitude of goodwill and interest in cooperating with those who are willing. This, according to 
Walt, can be perceived as a strategic move not to incite an opposition against it by being 
perceived as aggressive.  
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Russia‟s strategic relationship with Beijing was established in the 1990s under the 
administration of Boris Yeltsin. Russia turned its focus towards China to re-establish good 
relations, with the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, based on mutual support and common 
political concerns between the two actors (Wishnick 2001: 799). Russia and China have 
during the last 20 years found common ground and interest, in areas of security, trade and 
more importantly a common view on the international world order. Both countries object to a 
unipolar world order and seek to establish a genuine multipolar world order (Lo 2004: 296). 
Along with a growing relationship between Moscow and Beijing, Russia experienced tensions 
in their US and EU relations in disagreements about NATO expansion and democracy 
promotion in the former Soviet States (Kutchins in Bailes 2010: 36). One can argue that this 
along with other factors has through time pushed Russia closer to China and influenced 
Russia‟s self-image as a Central Asian state. The closer ties between Russia and China 
changes to some extent the above-argued attitude of Russia. In accordance with intention 
projection, one can argue that Russia cultivating its relationship with China has a positive 
affect within the region of Central Asia, but can sow doubts about Russian intentions towards 
its neighbours in the West.  
China has managed to become Russia‟s gateway to Central Asia and furthermore made Russia 
feel needed by the establishment of the SCO, where the engagement of Russia benefitted 
China in its efforts to solve its border issues (Troitskiy in Bailes 2007: 31). China‟s 
recognition of Russia as a needed ally is of significant meaning and can be viewed as motive 
for Russia to engage in the SCO. By engaging in cooperation with China, Russia 
demonstrates to the West that it has other attractive alliance alternatives and that Russia in 
itself is an attractive ally. On the account of external dependence, one can therefore argue that 
Russia can use its engagement within the SCO to position itself as not being over-dependent 
on the West, though this will pose a risk of instigating tensions in its relations with the West. 
This can, from a neorealist perspective, be perceived as Russia being aggressive in its 
intentions. It is especially highlighted when understanding how a strong relationship between 
Russia and China once again can position Russia as a great power in terms of the threat it 
poses with its allies in Central Asia. Taking in the arguments above one can argue that Russia, 
in its construction of identity and self-image, is aware of the significance of perceived 
intentions and projects an attitude that seeks to prevent the remaining member states, 
primarily China, from balancing against it.   
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China and Russia are as mentioned before in a somewhat similar situation on the account of 
their status as great powers, but they differ in their characters and overall position in the 
international system.  
The identity and self-image of China is significantly based on its rapidly growing economic 
capabilities. China‟s rapid economic growth increases the need for resources, which puts the 
states of Central Asia in an important strategic position for China due to their energy 
resources. This could be seen as a major driving force for China to co-find the SCO in its 
attempt to strengthen its relationship with the other states of Central Asia. This has 
established an image of China filling the “… active and constructive role in the region.” 
(Guang in Bailes 2007: 45). It can definitely be argued that China is viewed as one of the 
major powers of the SCO, not only when focusing on China‟s economic growth, but also in 
the way it has positioned itself within Central Asia. Once again applying Walt‟s perspective 
of intentions, one can argue that this also positions China in a situation where they easily can 
be perceived as aggressive in their intentions. Therefore, China needs to be careful about the 
attitude it projects and for it not to be too aggressive or dominant, because of its needs for 
resources and the stability the other states of Central Asia deliver. To secure this, China in the 
process of creating the SCO wanted: “To prevent the emergence of an anti-China alliance in 
the Central Asian region, Beijing originally wanted a well-knit organization that would 
emphasize economic cooperation.” (Panda 2012: 502p). This clearly states China‟s awareness 
on the importance of its fellow member states and its efforts to avoid a coalition in Central 
Asia balancing against it. Therefore it can be argued that China wishes to create an image of 
them being the „good financial provider‟. But, China does have a history with a very strong 
identity as being self-sufficient. Aspects like these are still deeply rooted in Chinese self-
image and thus one can argue that China will try to keep a position as one of, if not, the 
strongest states of the SCO. From Walt‟s perspective, it can be argued that this can be 
perceived as a challenge for China when trying to avoid a coalition balancing against it.  
When considering China‟s self-image and identity as an aspect important to its engagement in 
the SCO, its motive is to project a more collaborative and constructive role in the region as 
recommended by Walt. If successful in this China stands to benefit enormously by engaging 
in the SCO because of the level of influence it will be able to endorse and the position they 
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will adopt in the region. On the other hand this will entail that China must display a self-
image that contradicts its natural image as an independent and self-sufficient state.  
Looking at both Russia and China in the light of Walt‟s take on aggressive intentions as a 
source of threat, it is obvious that both actors are extremely aware of the importance of 
perceptions of intent when positioning themselves. Therefore one can argue that Russia and 
China‟s alliance behaviour on this account can be perceived as a balancing act, where none of 
the actors benefits from trying to dominate the SCO and risk being perceived as aggressive.  
5.2 Part Conclusion  
From the above examination it can be concluded that the pattern of alliance behaviour within 
the SCO can be characterised as balancing. This refers mainly to the behaviour of China and 
Russia, which have found common grounds on most of the analysed components and motives. 
The two actors seem to have evolved a strong sense of co-dependence on many aspects of 
their collaboration. Thus it can be concluded that an act of balancing is the preferred 
behaviour of both actors to secure common motives in the region of Central Asia. On many 
accounts the different sources of threats helps highlight the motives for the states‟ engagement 
in the SCO. From the perspective of the smaller member states it can be argued that on most 
of the components they display behaviour of bandwagoning. According to Walt this is 
expected due to their size and capabilities but as well the presence of two strong powers in 
their region. Though, it can be concluded that the presence of the smaller states is not 
unimportant. First of all they play a significant part in securing the stability within the region, 
which could not achieve singularly by Russia and China. Secondly, in the areas where Russia 
and China are sceptical of one another, they use cooperation with the smaller states to bypass 
each other.   
The theoretical insight provided by Walt highlights the many significant threats Russia and 
China project and thus the consequential need for managing such threats. Russia and China 
possess many advantages in various fields making one of them more dominant in these 
aspects. But, the threat and dependence of Russia and China in such a non-uniform fashion 
creates an unclear distinction of the power status between the two countries. This opaqueness 
makes it harder to generalise if one or the other is bandwagoning with the other, but easier to 
identify that they balance each other‟s aggregate threat. Due to the existence of many 
components of an alliance, as defined by Walt, the SCO can be categorised as an alliance 
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primarily serving Russia and China‟s goals while the smaller states benefit from 
bandwagoning as well. Therefore when applying Walt‟s theoretical framework to the 
establishment of the SCO, we can conclude that the SCO in many of its basic components 
match the alliance definition of Walt. This match will be discussed in more detail in the 
second part of the analysis. But it should be mentioned that the tensions and mistrust we can 
identify between Russia and China lies the possibilities for counter alliances within the SCO 
if the threat of one the two actors becomes too big.    
 
5.3 Sino-Russian Relations and World Order  
The Sino-Russian Relationship 
As seen above, the power interaction between China and Russia is a precarious situation for 
the states of great power and in such close proximity. Both, Russia and China excel in certain 
aspects while in others they are either dependent or inferior. Despite this, the aim of global 
prominence is a common factor for both countries. From assessing the sources of threats 
above, it becomes clearer that it is hard to place one country over another but they still project 
enough threat to be influential on the world stage. This characteristic of the power status of 
the two states enables them to cooperate and mutually achieve their global goals, which they 
may not achieve individually.  
This has also been acknowledged in Chinese and Russian foreign policy development since 
the reconciliation in 1989. The relationship has evolved from “partnership” to “constructive 
partnership” and finally “strategic partnership” through this tenure (Kutchins in Bellacqua 
2010: 36). Despite evident hesitance there is no denying that the two states have prioritised 
each other as partners. The world power balance residing in the Western hemisphere is a 
major unifying factor in the Sino-Russian relationship and is a concern vocalised by both the 
states. This lop-sidedness of the international system presents the two states with the choice of 
bandwagoning along with the dominant power or balance against it to create their desired 
multipolar world.  
The two powers‟ recognition of each other‟s status has led them to balance each other as well 
as external threats in the region through the SCO. In the international arena, the common 
interests do motivate the two countries towards an alliance but also the slow expansion of US 
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and EU influence can act as a catalyst. Russian willingness to collaborate with China is fairly 
dependent on US-Russia relations, as seen from the western-orientation of Russia from 2001-
2003, but Russia has increasingly felt its detachment from the western identity through its 
non-involvement in NATO and its “second-class” status in the G8 (Wishnick in Bellacqua 
2010: 35). This consolidates an argument for a strong alliance as Walt would argue for Russia 
and China to balance against US hegemony and western power control.  
In issues such as military, energy and world view we see convergence in Russia and China‟s 
interests. Consolidation in the military and energy sector would be of large threat to the West 
due to a combined aggregate and offensive power. US navy has shown concern over the 
capacity of Russia to help China become more capable in this area (Ibid:37). Russia and 
China already collaborate in global issues through their seats in the Security Council of the 
UN, and have voted together or have been responsible for changing resolutions, to a degree 
(Wishnick in Bellacqua 2010: 65pp). They have also been efficient in stabilising the Central 
Asian region and building confidence among each other.  
All these indicators would lead Walt to term the Sino-Russian “strategic partnership” an 
alliance, possibly an informal one, as one can argue such cooperation to augment the two 
countries‟ power, security and/or influence. The examined interaction between the two actors 
does also amount to an alliance due to multiple common interests and mutual benefits out of a 
unified trajectory of the two states. The convergence of the actors‟ interests and actions does 
indicate such an alliance, but due to absence of official security agreements and inconsistent 
foreign policy one cannot claim this relationship to be an iron clad one but rather an informal 
one.  
This brings us to the question of the repetition of “strategic partnership” instead of calling 
their relationship and possibly the framework of the SCO an alliance. According to Walt, in a 
world where balancing is the trend, emerging powers must understand the value of discretion 
in the display of aggressive intentions. One can assess the current power distribution of the 
world as an established one, as the US and its allies‟ partnerships has been institutionalised 
through NATO and other bodies. Also the large advantage in military capability of the US 
would be a deterrent for states to bandwagon with emerging powers and balance against the 
US. The current system can be labelled as a balancing prone world, therefore if Russia and 
China intend to align and balance the US, they would not be vocalising it, instead they would 
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try to minimise its display. This analysis could also be extended to the SCO, as its security 
aspects are very specific and the military integration is minimal if not non-existent. An 
organisation emphasising security or military can be potentially seen as aggressive, prompting 
balancing intentions from established strong states, and can explain the minimal involvement 
of CSTO in the SCO.  
“Alliance” is a loaded term and the threat perception of it is high, especially seen in an 
historical context of Russia and China from a Western perspective. Due to the prevalent 
alliance environment, it would be expected of Russia and China to avoid drawing attention to 
their growing relations. Having said this, the areas of convergence are mutually beneficially 
for the two actors making regional cooperation their priority. This “alliance” can be a 
consequence of the higher coordinated partnership and increased understanding and 
confidence among each other.  
Russia and China‟s non-committal attitude, seen in the political and economic arenas, also 
makes one to question the longevity of such an alliance, the commitment level and the 
foundation of it. Taking into consideration the motives and commitment levels of the 
relationship between Russia and China, we believe that three types of alliances can be 
identified.  The types of alliance we can identify are 1) Alliance of Convenience 2) Alliance 
based on values and visions 3) Natural Alliance. The three types relates to Walt‟s levels of 
commitment in alliances, which are high, moderate and low.     
The geographical proximity and aggregate threat that they project does make them weary of 
each other and thus a common external threat would work as a unifying tool. The US 
hegemonic status and the power imbalance can possibly function as this tool. Countering such 
a threat would unify them, maybe just until the goal is achieved, while achieving their desired 
output of global power status and the creation of a multipolar world. This could characterise 
their relationship as an alliance of convenience with low levels of commitment.   
The second form of alliance could be based on fundamentally shared norms, values and 
visions for the world system. This would be similar to the above but the values and visions 
would take precedence over the convenience of creating an alliance. Such an alliance would 
demand higher commitment level and the choice of risking tangible losses and diplomatic 
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sacrifices. The Sino-Russian relations do show some indications of this on the political front 
but not in terms of tangible asset sacrifices.  
The third and the last kind of alliance could be based on the natural tendencies of the 
countries to align. The two countries have shared an intertwined history and mutual interest, 
which could make them natural allies. Their motivation to align could be based on such 
factors as well, although this form of an alliance would require full commitment in tangible 
assets and the diplomatic sphere with the risk of some sacrifices.  
Russia and China are still not fully economically or militarily integrated. Russia fears the 
Chinese market pressure and military empowerment of China through arms transfers. The 
Chinese are growing more independent from Russian arms imports and developing and 
exporting their own arms is a growing issue (Holtom et. al. 2011: 5). Although both China 
and Russia support each other politically, their military cooperation has been low. When 
China proposed to hold its joint-military exercise with Russia near Taiwan, Russia was 
hesitant and another location was chosen. This exemplifies how Russia did not want to be 
involved in the issues with Taiwan (Kutchins in Bellacqua 2010: 47). China is also not keen 
on being over dependent on Russia, thus in the field of energy both actors seek multiple 
energy partners in order to avoid being dependent on each other.  
This is a clear indication of the degree of commitment of the two states and their hesitance to 
sacrifice tangible assets such as military, people and land. The above shows that the two 
countries are still very much concerned with self-preservation preceding the interests of any 
alliance. The Russians have been tussling with their identity and orientation. One can also 
observe that the Russian foreign policy orientation towards China is also impacted by the 
health of its relations with the US. This draws us from claiming that there exists a natural 
bond for alliance in the form of shared history, identity or culture. This can then impact the 
degree to which Russia is willing to make sacrifices in its diplomatic relationships. One also 
has to keep in mind the current embargo on arms transfers on China and analysts say that if 
this western arms supply opens up, it will undermine Russia‟s importance for China (Ibid:48). 
Here again there are doubts about full commitments from Russia and China.      
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All these indicators point towards an alliance category between “alliance of convenience” and 
“alliance based on values and visions” and the commitment level also lies between low and 
moderate as the two countries do not just cooperate at a symbolic level, but the commitment 
to integrate various alliance aspects are still lacking or is at a nascent level. Russia and China 
share many interests that provide it with motivation for a fully committed alliance but mistrust 
and individual interest take precedence as of now. This results in an alliance that has potential 
and mutual benefits but requires sacrifices, which they are currently not willing to make.    
Walt outlines factors that determine the longevity of an alliance. He identifies large degrees of 
institutionalisation of the alliance, presence of liberal regimes and explicit rules of alliance 
formation to increase the life span of an alliance (Walt 2009: 90). Combined with the level of 
commitment, Walt would predict that the Chinese-Russian alliance has a short life-span as 
there are no official institutional symbols of their alliance. One could argue that the SCO is 
such an institutional form that facilitates alliance behaviour, but it is also a weaker one due to 
the absence of security clauses. Due to Russia‟s questionable democratic environment and 
China‟s one party system, scholars may not label them as liberal regimes causing further 
doubt about the alliance‟s longevity. And, finally, there are no official and publicly 
established rules of alliance decision making, but rather a mutual understanding between 
Russia and China that dictates current behaviour.  
Therefore, analysing the Sino-Russian cooperation through Walt‟s framework we can identify 
elements to be able to label their “Strategic Partnership” as an alliance. This alliance‟s 
commitment level and longevity are questionable from Walt‟s perspective, but the same 
framework highlights Russia and China‟s incentives to keep a coordinated partnership 
discreet. Their alliance still does hold promise but current behaviour plays into a weak 
characteristic and can be seen as a long-term developing one rather than a fully established 
alliance. Even though the characteristics of Russia and China‟s relationship is debatable, how 
the outside world perceives the relationship plays an important role and outlines possible 
responses to a growing Sino-Russian relations.  
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World Order  
The “hyper power” status of the US was a concern reiterated during the presidency of Bill 
Clinton and continued onto the elections of George W. Bush Jr. and the events following post 
9/11 (Walt 2009: 95). This primacy of the US has been a concern for China and Russia 
despite their individual interests with the US, leading to their vocal vision of a multipolar 
world in 1997. Due to the progression of globalisation one could argue that there has been an 
automatic erosion of US primacy due to systemic changes. This erosion is tilting the world 
balance towards a multipolar world due to emergence of powerful states such as Russia and 
China, combined with US allies‟ concerns about American power hold (Ibid.).       
Thus, in an environment conducive to multipolarity one must identify the impact the existence 
of a Russia-China alliance has in accelerating the shift towards multipolarity. US as the 
former unipole, and regional hegemon of the West, is being challenged by the new power 
distribution of the international system. Therefore the relationship of Russia and China can be 
perceived as an emerging threat capable of balancing the power of the US, while propagating 
the construction of multiple power centres supplementing the emerging new world order 
(Ryan in Bellacqua 2010: 196).  
From a neorealist perspective such a challenge is predictable as unipolarity is the most 
unstable form of world order. Walt in 2009 observed that despite traditional systemic 
difficulties for any counterbalancing alliance, there additionally exist obstacles placed by the 
Western powers using its established influence. This is core to the effectiveness of the Sino-
Russian alliance in effecting world order as they face a greater obstacle in challenging the 
institutionalised power hold. As discussed above, we are aware of the low-moderate 
commitment of the alliance, and it can be argued that such levels of commitment are not 
enough to challenge obstacles identified by Walt. According to him, Russia and China would 
require a larger coalition to balance the current US primacy or power stronghold of the West. 
Such coordination would be a diplomatic struggle and would entail large transaction costs and 
dilemmas about collective action (Walt 2009: 96).  
Kenneth Waltz would argue that the only way of achieving China and Russia‟s aim of 
balancing is through hard balancing. This should also have been true for recent attempts at 
altering world balance but many scholars claim that most attempts are tentative or half-
hearted (Ibid: 102). If aggressive intentions and actions are the only tools for Russia and 
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China to reach their goals then they are currently incapable of achieving the power shift that 
they desire. Russia and China both show some hard balancing tendencies by prioritising the 
modernisation and increasing military capabilities, though they have not publicly directed 
these efforts towards any particular threat relating to world order.  
Such cautiousness of Russia and China regarding balancing could be credited to the fact that 
there are no direct threats towards them currently but only the prevalence of potential levels of 
threat. No state wants to provoke other powers at the risk of incurring losses furthermore the 
interconnectedness of the globalised world makes it hard for states to make abrupt moves 
against each other. Such interdependence even between possible adversaries is clearly 
highlighted in Chinese ownership of US debt, in order to keep the Chinese currency low and 
enable further US-Chinese trade (Phillips 2012). This is a reflection of the changing scenario 
of the current system. Waltz and Walt base their predictions on a bipolar world, but such 
polarisation does not exist presently. Hence, one needs to take into account the 
interdependence and the fear of unnecessary losses. This leads states to balance in a soft 
manner or soft balancing in specific areas to enhance one‟s own interest.  
One can argue that Russia and China are employing soft balancing tactics through a 
consolidated front and their increased coordinated cooperation in many global aspects. This is 
also compatible to their commitment level of low-moderate by not having to explicitly 
identify threats and put out resources and assets. Such coordinated cooperation in various 
fronts helps them influence the course of global decisions in their favour, as seen in the 
Central Asian region and with cases concerning Iran and North Korea in the UN (Wishnick in 
Bellacqua 2010: 65pp). 
Although soft balancing is a term Walt uses in 2009, he expected more explicit actions in 
1987 in his book Origins of Alliances. This seems like a pragmatic understanding by Walt and 
highlights the need for revision in certain aspects of neo-realism. We do not see hard 
balancing by Russia and China, although it could be expected in the long term, thus the 
current scenario indicates behaviour of soft balancing. According to Kenneth Waltz such a 
tactic would be of no avail for Russia and China in their quest for shifting the power balance, 
but if one adopts a more pragmatic paradigm one can argue that China and Russia combined 
can and currently do enhance each other‟s influence and power status. This consequently 
makes the emergence of a power centre in the Central Asian realm a possibility, thus 
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impacting the emerging world order. Staying within the neorealist framework it can therefore 
be argued that there is a need to keep a strict eye on the relationship between Russia and 
China and it should be viewed with great concern from a western perspective. Though on this 
account the views of Daniel W. Drezner (2007) should be taking into consideration, he offers 
a solution to neo-realisms fear of severe great power rivalry in a multipolar world. Drezner 
advises that rising powers like China, India etc. are incorporated in broad international 
cooperation to alleviate the uncertainty of the future actions of these regimes (Drezner 2007: 
34). Following Drezner recommendations along with Walt‟s lines of thought on the account 
of aggressive intentions, entails that US along with the West act with caution when making a 
threat assessment on Sino-Russian relations.  
5.4 Part Conclusion  
From the above examination it can be concluded that the relationship between Russia and 
China can be characterised as an alliance on the basis of Walt‟s alliance definition. However, 
we are dealing with an alliance with low commitment levels due to the absence of official 
security agreement along with mistrust in different areas between the two actors. Though, 
from the co-dependence and common interest the two actors share, it can be concluded that 
the alliance has the potential of reaching stronger commitment levels. In the notion of Sino-
Russian relationship being able to balance against the power of the US, one can conclude that 
the alliance is not yet at a stage where this is possible. However, that does not mean that the 
US and the West are not aware of the size of the threat the two powerful actors are capable of 
posing as an emerging power centre in the East. In a dynamic world with shifting power 
balances, actors with the capabilities such of China and Russia‟s can impact the emerging 
world order. In conclusion, Russia and China combined have the ability to enhance each 
other‟s influence and power levels on the global stage while propagating multipolarity. 
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6. Conclusion  
In our efforts to characterise the relationship between Russia and China from the theoretical 
foundation of Stephen M. Walt‟s alliance theory and departing from their engagement in the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, we have reached the following conclusions.   
China and Russia‟s engagement in the SCO highlights the motives behind the cooperation 
between the two actors. On the grounds of our analysis we have established that motives of 
regional security, economic integration and trade in areas of energy and arms are significant 
components in the Sino-Russian relationship, which are facilitated through the cooperation‟s 
within the SCO. Viewing the relationship of the two actors from the perspective of Walt‟s 
Balance of Threat theory it can be concluded that the different sources of threat identified by 
Walt contributes with valid explanations and classification of Sino-Russian relations.  
The threats of aggregate power, offensive power and geographic proximity, highlights most of 
the motives behind the actors‟ engagement in the SCO. The threat of aggregate power plays 
into most of the components analysed, and elucidates motives of both absolute gains of power 
but also the need for awareness on the relative gains generated by the collaborations. 
Therefore aggregate power functions as both a motivating factor and an aspect that challenges 
the relationship between Russia and China. The threat of offensive power can be seen as the 
threat that tips the scale in this balanced relationship. In the perspective of the SCO, we can 
conclude that Russia has the upper hand when it comes to offensive power. Even though this 
positions Russia as a greater threat in the region, it can be argued that cooperation within the 
SCO and between Russia and China has not been strained due to this factor. This ease can be 
credited to Russia‟s willingness to transfer arms and technology with China, which can be 
viewed as Russia‟s attempt to scale down its threat projection in the region. The threat of 
geographic proximity is clearly highlighted with the establishment of the SCO. Instability in 
the region caused by terrorist and separatist movements motivates the actors in a large degree 
to cooperate, and through collaborations balance against the threats this instability poses to 
the region. The stability of the region is one of the main concerns of Russia and China, due to 
the potential of power gains a peaceful environment entails. It can therefore be concluded that 
the motive of securing regional stability and the decreasing regional conflict, is where we can 
trace the highest levels of commitment to the cooperation between the two states, due to the 
possibilities of positive spill-over effects. 
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Walt‟s balance of threat theory has enabled us to explain the alliance behaviour seen in the 
cooperation between the two actors. The source of threat he identifies as aggressive intentions 
is a determinant in Russia and China‟s agenda not to project an aggressive façade but rather 
the role as a constructive actor. It can be concluded that the general pattern of alliance 
behaviour within the SCO can be identified as a balancing act. This is mainly seen in the 
behaviour of Russia and China, exemplified by the awareness of the threat projections of one 
another. The smaller states in most aspects resort to bandwagoning with Russia and China due 
to the large capability gab between the member states of the SCO. It can be concluded that 
there is an unclear distinction of the power status between Russia and China, and therefore 
characterising Sino-Russian relations as a balancing act is the most suitable conclusion.  
Russia and China prefers to characterise their relationship as a “Strategic Partnership”, but 
when analysing their relationship through Walt‟s theoretical foundation, it can be concluded 
that their relationship does have resemblance to Walt‟s alliance definition. Continued 
coordinated cooperation through the platform of the SCO has helped build confidence and 
closer relations along with positive understandings of each other. However the alliance cannot 
be characterised as either strong or formal, though this alliance holds beneficial prospects for 
both actors. A co-dependent relationship can be established between the two states, which can 
be seen as a motivating factor for them to strengthen their alliance, though that would require 
sacrifices that both actors seem unwilling to make, currently. Although one may also argue 
that this is Russia and China‟s attempt to keep their increased cooperation discreet, and 
subsequently not to draw hostile attention. Seen through a neorealist framework, the moderate 
level of commitment combined with low levels of institutionalisation, structure regarding the 
alliance and the absence of liberal regimes are all signs of a short life span of the alliance.   
The moderate level of the commitment from Russia and China in the alliance makes it 
difficult for the actors to pursue means of hard balancing against established powers. 
However, due to a transitioning world order, it is still possible for them to balance and elevate 
their position through soft balancing. Such form of balancing helps them avoid direct 
confrontations and still preserving their priority of being discreet about their relations. This 
becomes essential for them to achieve their goals, as they are currently unwilling to sacrifice 
their external dependencies and aspirations of better relations with other states. In this 
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globalised and interconnected world, the two countries cannot risk raising suspicion at the 
cost of the health of their economic and diplomatic relations with other key states.  
Thus, a consolidated front by Russia and China practicing soft balancing in key aspects of 
decision making help them strengthen their positions in the global arena. With the systemic 
changes brought about by globalisation, it has become easier for them to soft balance. Such 
persistent behaviour of soft balancing can be predicted and expected to be employed by 
Russia and China in order to achieve their goal of multipolarity.     
The neorealist framework presented by Walt has provided us with the tool to analyse the 
current identity of Russia and China‟s partnership. The neorealist perspective highlights key 
issues such as alliance behaviour and sources of threats, but is rather blurred on multipolarity. 
Our adaptation of Walt‟s framework has led to us to the conclusion of this project, but still it 
lacks the same theoretical support in the current world order as the one it can provide in an 
analysis in a bipolar world. This leads us to contemplate a revision of certain aspects of the 
neorealist paradigm.  
When discussing the world system from a singular theoretical viewpoint, it seems to provide 
an incomplete understanding, where multiple perspectives could explain some of the 
shortcomings of the other perspectives. From a neorealist perspective alliance behaviour in a 
multipolar world is not very concrete and the eventualities of such a system are not explored 
further than the assessment of it being unstable or temporary.        
In conclusion, understanding the relationship of Russia and China is in the interest of many. 
This is both due to their individual characteristics but to a higher degree due to the levels of 
power and influence the combining forces of the two actors can amount to. Therefore, on the 
basis of this project we can conclude that the alliance between Russia and China, though it 
still is weak and fairly young, hold the potentials to affect the new emerging world order.  
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7. Afterthoughts  
We have chosen to build this project on the foundation of one basic theory. Walt‟s theory on 
alliance formations and balancing of threats gave us an insight into how a neorealist in 1987 
would perceive alliances in international relations and which predictions he had for the world 
order of the future. By only relying on the works of Walt we were bound to stumble upon 
some shortcomings and problems when applying it to our case. Although we did account for 
some foreseeable difficulties we realise the need for a more non-western oriented theorist for 
an alternate understanding of our observations, as Walt came across very American-centric.    
We entered this project with the assumption that when influential actors such as Russia and 
China engage in smaller and intimate cooperation, it must hold some significance. We 
believed such a move would attract global attention and in some way also affect the current 
system. Our examination of the SCO and Russia-China relations revealed that this 
collaboration was indeed unique but a developing one. The co-dependence and common 
interest between the two actors were a major find, as well as the interesting role of the smaller 
Central Asian states.  
We thought of the close collaboration between Russia and China to be a big symbol of 
alliance behaviour. Although true to a degree, the regional concerns were the main drivers 
behind the collaboration within the SCO. As for the alliance nature, we expected higher levels 
of commitment between Russia and China to counter the western stronghold of power, but 
many factors of what it entails to be a rising power, gave us a clearer picture on this notion. 
Although we did expect Russia and China to conceal its intentions of aligning, we thought 
their commitment level would be higher and their goals more explicit.     
An interesting discussion that we see emerging is the explanation of actions once 
multipolarity is achieved by China and Russia; What comes after multipolarity? From a 
neorealist perspective multipolarity is a momentary stage, and when discussing a relationship 
between two great powers the argument will be that each state would seek to maximise its 
position and maybe even strive of becoming the regional hegemon. It would be interesting to 
examine the course of the Russian-Chinese alliance once multipolarity is achieved. This 
perspective would reject the possibility of multipolarity being the genuine motive of China 
and Russia. So what is the future of Sino-Russian relations in a multipolar world? And what 
happens when one of the actors surpasses the other in capabilities? Would this alliance 
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survive after both the countries are recognised as established powers? How would they react 
to each other‟s increased threat level? Would the race for regional hegemony spark another 
balancing act?  
Another aspect which could have been interesting giving more attention, is the Western 
perspective of the relationship between Russia and China. Can we trace changes in the West‟s 
approach to the two actors since the establishment of the SCO? Aligning with this aspect is 
the discussion of interconnectedness and how alliances are created and perceived in this new 
system. A further investigation of the effects of globalisation on alliance formation could be 
relevant to consider – whether or not alliances today are created on other aspects than state 
survival, such as financial and climate security.  
From our perspective this project embraces more aspects than we have been able to process. 
But, as a result of our work on this project we have obtained new knowledge of the many 
aspects and elements that come into play when states choose to cooperate. Due to our 
immersion in only one theoretical perspective we have achieved a deeper understanding of 
how Stephen M. Walt, along with the neorealist camp, perceives the world and its processes. 
This may seem as narrow understanding of how the world interacts and we are aware of that 
another theory would probably have presented us with different answers than the ones we 
have obtained. However we feel that the works of this project entails valid contributions to the 
on-going discussion on the significance of collaborations between strong actors in the 
international system and presents an outlook on the future world order with ties growing 
stronger between Russia and China.  
 
 
  
  
58 
 
Bibliography  
Articles  
 Anthony, I. (1998), Russia and the Arms Trade, Stockholm, Oxford University 
Press.  
 Aris, S. (2009), The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: „Tackling the Three 
Evils‟. A Regional Response to Non-traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-
Western Bloc?, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61, No. 3. 
 Bailes, A. J. K. et. al., (2007), The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Stockholm, 
SIRPI Policy Paper No. 17.  
 Bellacqua, J. A. (2010), The Future of China-Russia Relations, Lexington, 
University press of Kentucky, ed.1. 
 Buszynski, L. (2004), RUSSIA AND THE CIS IN 2003: Regional Reconstruction, 
Asian Survey, University of California Press, Vol. 44, No. 1. 
 Chung, Chien-peng, (2004), The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China's 
Changing Influence in Central, The China Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, 
No. 180. 
 Donaldson, R. H. & Donaldson, John A. (2003) The Arms Trade in Russian-
Chinese Relations: Identity, Domestic Politics, and Geopolitical Positioning, 
International Studies Quarterly, Wiley-Blackwell, Vol. 47, No. 4. 
 Drezner, D. W. (2007), The New New World Order, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2. 
 Ferdinand, P. (2007), Sunset, Sunrise: China and Russia Construct a New 
Relationship, Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5. 
 Fravel, M. (2005), Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation Explaining 
China‟s Compromises in Territorial Disputes, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 
2. 
 Fuglsang, L. & Olsen, P.B. (2004), Videnskabsteori i samfundvidenskaberne - På 
tværs af fagkulturer og paradigmer, Frederiksberg C, Roskilde Universitet Forlag, 
ed.2 print 3. 
 Guo, S. (2006), China‟s “Peaceful Rise” in the 21st Century, Hampshire, Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, ed. 1. 
59 
 
 Harris, L (1993), Xinjiang, Central Asia and the Implications for China's Policy in 
the Islamic World, The China Quartely, No. 133.   
 Pyadushkin, M. et. al. (2003), Beyond the Kalashnikov: Small Arms Production, 
Exports, and Stockpiles in the Russian Federation, Small Arms Survey (SAS), 
Occasional Papers No.10. 
 Holtom, P. B. et. al. (2011) Trends in international arms transfers, SIPRI Fact 
Sheet.  
 Jackson, R. & Sørensen, G. (2010), Introduction to International Relations – 
Theories & Approaches, United States, Oxford University Press, ed. 4.  
 Jing-Dong Yuan, (2010), China's Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 19, No. 67. 
 Lanteigne, M. (2007), The Development of the Shanghai Co-operation 
Organization as a Security Community, Pacific Affairs, University of British 
Columbia, Vol. 79, No. 4. 
 Layne, C. (1993), The Unipolar Illusion – Why New Great Powers Will Rise, 
International Security, Vol.17, No.4. 
 Lo, B. (2004), The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia's Evolving China 
Policy, Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2. 
 Lüthi, L. M. (2008), The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, 
Series: Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, Princeton University 
Press. 
 Nichol, J. (2012), Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. 
Interests, Congressional Research Service. 
 Olsen, P. B. (2005), Research Techniques, In: Problem-Oriented Project Work – a 
workbook, Olsen, P. B. & Pedersen, K., Frederiksberg C, Roskilde University Press, 
ed. 1. 
 Pallin, C. V. (ed.) (2012), Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective, 
FOI, Swedish Ministry of Defence. 
 Panda, J. P., (2012), Beijing's Perspective on Expansion of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization: India, South Asia, and the Spectrum of Opportunities 
in China's Open Approach, Asian Perspective, Vol. 36, No. 3. 
60 
 
 Rangsimaporn, P. (2006), Russia's Debate on Military-Technological Cooperation 
with China: From Yeltsin to Putin, Asian Survey, University of California Press 
Vol. 46, No. 3. 
 Śmigielski, R. (2010), The Role of Arms Exports in the Foreign Policy of the 
Russian Federation, Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), BULLETIN No. 
54 (130). 
 Walt, S. M. (1987), The Origins of Alliances, New York, Cornell University Press, 
1.ed.  
 Walt, S. M. (2009), Alliances in a Unipolar World, World Politics, Vol. 61, Issue 01. 
 Wilhelmsen, J. & Flikke, G. (2011), Chinese–Russian Convergence and Central 
Asia, Geopolitics, Vol. 16, No. 4. 
 Wishnick, E (2001), RUSSIA AND CHINA, Brothers again? Asian Survey, Vol. 
41, No. 5. 
 Wohlforth, W. C. (1999), The Stability of a Unipolar World, International Security, 
The MIT Press, Vol. 24, No. 1. 
 Zhuplev, A. (2008), Economic Internationalization of Russia: Roots, Trends, and 
Scenarios, International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science 
politique, Vol. 29, No. 1. 
 
Web Pages 
 BBC, (2011), Russia-China oil pipeline opens, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-pacific-12103865, viewed on the 12/12/2012. 
 Blagov, S. (2010), Russia, Kazakhstan mull trade revival, Asia Times, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LC19Ag01.html, viewed on the 
12/12/2012.  
 Declaration of the Establishment of the SCO, (2001), 
http://www.hrichina.org/content/5207, viewed on the 29/11/2012. 
 Phillips, M. (2012), China vs. Japan: The Winner? The US, http://qz.com/7781/china-
japan-and-the-race-to-lend-the-us-trillions/, viewed on 12/12/2012. 
61 
 
 Sage Journals (2006), Documentary Methods, 
http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/keywords-in-qualitative-methods/n18.xml, viewed on 
the 30/11/2012. 
 Shen, W. (2012), China and its Neighbours: troubled relations, http://www.eu-
asiacentre.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=46, viewed on the 7/12/2012. 
 Watts, J (2010), China overtakes US as world's biggest energy consumer, The 
Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/aug/03/china-overtakes-us-
energy-consumer viewed on the 12/12/2012. 
